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This dissertation consists of three essays that explore the relationship between neighborhood
crime and educational attainment. The first essay, entitled “The Effect of High School Shootings
on Schools and Student Performance,” analyzes how fatal shootings in high schools affect schools
and students using data from shooting databases, school report cards, and the Common Core of
Data. I examine schools’ test scores, enrollment and number of teachers, as well as graduation,
attendance and suspension rates at schools that experienced a shooting, employing a difference-
in-differences strategy that uses other high schools in the same district as the comparison group.
The findings suggest that homicidal shootings significantly decrease the enrollment of students in
grade 9 (the high-school entrance grade) and test scores in math and English standardized tests.
Using student-level data from California, I confirm that shootings lower test results for students
that remain enrolled. I find no statistically significant effect of suicidal shootings on all outcome
variables of interest and this suggests that the traumatic impact of homicidal shootings play a key
role in explaining our results.
The second chapter, “The Effect of Violent Crime on Educational Attainment,” focuses on vi-
olent crime as an important determinant of educational attainment. I use two different models, a
fixed effects model and an instrumental variable model to identify the causal effect of violent crime
on educational attainment. First, a city fixed effects model with city-specific linear trends exploits
different trends in violent crime among 229 major cities. The results indicate that the association
between violent crime and grade 12 enrollment is significant while the same association with grade
9 enrollment is not. This difference suggests that student drop-outs drive the decline in enrollment
associated with a high violent crime rate. Second, this study uses the implementation of the Elec-
tronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) program as an instrument to estimate the effect of violent crime
on educational attainment. The EBT program implementation changed the method of payment
for welfare recipients to debit cards from paper checks. This change lowered local crime rates by
reducing cash flow and opportunities for crime in disadvantaged neighborhoods. Using the 1997
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, two-stage least squares estimates show that exposure to
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violent crimes lowers educational attainment. These results provide evidence that non-educational
policies can affect educational outcomes and shed light on the importance of coordinating educa-
tional and non-educational policies to enhance student educational outcomes.
The final chapter, “The Effect of the Safe Schools/Healthy Students Initiative on Educa-
tional Outcomes,” studies the effect of the Safe Schools/Healthy Students (SS/HS) Initiative, a
community-level intervention, on educational outcomes. From 1999 to 2009, 365 local education
agencies received the SS/HS Initiative grant for their proposed school-community partnership plans.
I use two different approaches, a difference-in-difference model and a propensity score matching
model, to identify the effect of the school-community partnerships on educational outcomes. First,
the results from a difference-in-difference model indicate that the SS/HS Initiative increases grade
12 enrollment by 1.9 percent, respectively. Second, I use a propensity score matching model to
match grantee local education agencies with similar, non-grantee local education agencies. The re-
sults from this model show that grantee school districts have at least 3.3 percent higher enrollment
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There are many determinants of educational outcomes and identifying the effects of these determi-
nants is an important research question with strong policy implications. Among these determinants,
I focus on acute violent incidents and average level of violence. However, it is hard to quantify the
causal effect of these determinants. The goal of this dissertation is to identify the effect of different
types of violence on student educational outcomes. In addition, an educational intervention that
involves other community members may be effective in improving educational outcomes. Thus,
a second goal of this dissertation is to measure the effect of a community-level intervention on
educational outcomes.
The first chapter, “The Effect of High School Shootings on Schools and Student Performance,”
examines the effect of fatal shootings in high schools on enrollment and test results. Since fatal high
school shootings are an extreme form of violence, studying the effect of these incidents provides
evidence on the causal effect of violence on educational outcomes. The findings suggest that high
school shootings decrease the enrollment of students in grade 9 and negatively affect test results in
math and English. In addition, I find that the negative effect is associated with homicidal shootings
but not with suicidal shootings and this suggests that the traumatic impact of homicidal shootings
play a key role in explaining our results.
The second chapter, “The Effect of Violent Crime on Educational Attainment,” identifies vio-
lent crime as a determinant of educational attainment. I use two research designs and each research
design relies on different identification assumptions. Both approaches show consistent results that
higher violent crime in a city reduces educational attainment. The results provide strong evidence
that violent crime is an important determinant of educational attainment. Also, the results in-
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dicate that non-educational policies may affect educational outcomes, and coordination between
educational and non-educational policies may generate synergies to improve educational outcomes.
The final chapter, “The Effect of the Safe Schools/Healthy Students Initiative on Educational
Outcomes,” studies the effect of a community-level intervention on educational outcomes. Once
again I use two approaches to answer the same research question, and they show consistent results
that the Safe Schools/Healthy Students Initiative increases enrollment. This chapter provides
evidence that collaboration among local education agencies, local public mental health authorities,
and local law enforcement agencies is effective in improving educational outcomes.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of High School Shootings
on Schools and Student Performance1
There have been a total of 157 deadly school shootings in U.S. high schools between 1994 and 2009.
Although shootings at schools account for a relatively small number of teenage murders, they are
not unprecedented in U.S. high schools and the threat of these shootings is ubiquitous. School
shootings may affect all the students attending the school at which they occur and their parents.
Deadly school shootings have a potentially large effect on students and schools once they occur.
These incidents can affect students’ decision about whether to stay at their school, affect their
cognitive skills and influence their behavior during their time at school. Also, the educational
consequences of deadly school shootings on enrollment and student performance have not been
analyzed in the literature.
We address three questions related to the consequences of homicidal and suicidal high school
shootings. First, we address whether enrollment patterns change after the shootings, which would
result from school selection by students and parents or from students dropping out of the school
system. Second, we examine whether deadly shootings lower test scores in schools in subsequent
years, which helps to establish longer-term trauma effects. Third, we look at the effects deadly
shootings have on a range of behavioral variables such as graduation, attendance and suspension
rates.
This paper provides the first empirical estimates of the effect of extreme violence in schools
on enrollment, student performance and student behavior. Potential negative effects of school
1In collaboration with Louis-Philippe Beland.
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shootings on student achievement are important for policy makers, especially when deciding whether
or not to allocate resources toward creating a safer school environment. Especially, it is in policy
makers’ keen interest to assess the danger of such incidents as the President mentioned in his State
of the Union address the negative effects of gun violence in schools, for two consecutive years, in
2013 and 2014.
We estimate the causal impact of deadly high school shootings by using a difference-in-difference
strategy, comparing schools that had fatal shootings with other high schools in the same district
that did not experience such shootings. To estimate this, we merge an existing database on fatal
shootings with the high-school-level Common Core of Data (CCD) and school report cards to
form a panel of schools. Because we compare schools within the same district, our comparison
group exhibits an environment similar to our group of interest aside from the turmoil generated by
the shooting. Our empirical strategy relies on the assumption that these deadly school shooting
incidents are exogenous in their timing.
We find that enrollment in grade nine drops following a deadly shooting, though we do not
observe enrollment effects on subsequent grades. We also find standardized test scores in math and
English are lower in affected schools up to three years after a deadly shooting. However, we do not
find statistically significant impacts on behavioral outcomes: graduation, attendance or suspension
rates. We find that suicidal shootings have no significant impact on our variables of interest. This
suggests that it is not death or sadness per say that is driving the results, rather it is the trauma
of terror and victimization.
This leaves open the question of whether students are affected by shootings or if differences
in performance instead reflect a composition effect. Composition effect can dominate when high-
achieving students leave the school following a shooting, which then results in lower average scores
for the school. To address this question, we use student-level data from California. This data allows
us to identify the average treatment effect of shootings, conditional on students staying at the same
high school after a shooting. Using student-level panel data from California high schools, we find
that shootings have a negative effect on continuing students’ math and English test scores.
2.1 Framework
Student violence in high schools may hinder students from learning efficiently. Violent incidents
could be a distraction from learning; fear and an unsafe atmosphere could impede students from
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being open to new opportunities that are essential to learning and, even more problematically,
students may avoid attending school. Also, violent incidents could affect the allocation of teaching
time. These factors could influence students’ cognitive performance and behavioral outcomes.
Multiple studies show that students are negatively affected by violent crimes on several dimen-
sions. Berman et al. (1996) find that students who have been exposed to violent crimes show a
greater number of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms. Among those who were ex-
posed to a violent crime, 44.3 percent were categorized as having “moderate” PTSD symptoms and
18.6 percent as ‘severe’ PTSD symptoms.2 Berman et al. find that victims and witnesses exhibit
a similar number of PTSD symptoms. Likewise, Pynoos et al. (1987) find that elementary school
students experienced PTSD after a fatal sniper attack on their school playground.3 The severity
of PTSD was worse for all exposure levels if the students knew the victim well. However, they find
no difference in severity by age, sex or ethnicity.
Building on evidence that violent crime causes PTSD, McEwen and Sapolsky (1995) demon-
strate that stress, which is more common in people aﬄicted with PTSD, increases the frequency
of declarative errors, but has no effect on tasks that have fewer declarative and more procedu-
ral components. Declarative knowledge involves explicit knowledge of a fact, whereas procedural
knowledge is implicit knowledge of how to do something.
Recent papers study the effects of school violence on educational outcomes. Poutvaara and
Ropponen (2010) analyze the immediate effect of a school shooting in September 2008 at a school
in Finland in the middle of a national exam period that lasts 2-3 weeks. They find that the shooting
decreased average test scores for boys but not for girls. Since a fatal shooting can be considered
exogenous to other determinants of educational outcomes, Poutvaara and Ropponen’s estimates
can be interpreted as causal.4
Other papers that study the effect of neighborhood violence on student performance include
Grogger (1997) and Sharkey (2010). Both of these papers show that students are negatively af-
fected by violence in their neighborhood. Grogger (1997) studies how local violence, defined as a
combination of school violence and neighborhood violence, negatively affects educational attain-
ment. Sharkey (2010) identifies the negative effect of exposure to a local homicide on the cognitive
2The categorization is based on the Frederick scoring system of the Post-traumatic Stress Disorder Reaction Index
(PTSD-RI).
3On Feb 24, 1984, a sniper began firing from a second-story window across the street from an elementary school
at children on the school playground. Two children were killed and 13 were injured.
4Chandler et al. (2011) build a predictive model of shootings, which helps determine which students should be
included in a highly targeted and resource-intensive mentorship program in Chicago. Chandler et al. (2010) find that
shootings are very hard to predict.
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performance of children. He finds that a sample of African-American children between five and 17
years old had lower scores on educational assessments when they were exposed to a homicide in
the Census block group less than a week before the assessment. Approaching the research question
from a different angle, randomized residential mobility experiments such as the Gautreaux program
in Chicago and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Moving to Opportunity
(MTO) have been analyzed (Rosenbaum 1995; Sanbonmatsu et al. 2006). Burdick-Will et al.
(2010) find evidence that neighborhood relocation affected children’s outcomes in two MTO cities,
Baltimore and Chicago, and they suggest exposure to violence could explain the results given that
Baltimore and Chicago have much higher rates of crime than other MTO cities.
Our study contributes to the literature by using extreme violent incidents to minimize the
selection bias that is generated by concentration of violence in disadvantageous neighborhoods in a
non-experimental analysis. With a reasonable assumption that fatal school shootings are exogenous
in their timing, the identified estimates are unbiased effect of violence in schools on educational
outcomes. Also, separating the effect of violence taking place in school from neighborhood violence
is an additional contribution of the paper.
2.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our main data source of shooting incidents is the Report on School Associated Violent Deaths from
the National School Safety Center (2010). The report uses newspaper articles to track shootings
between 1994 and 2009.5 Additional school shooting data is from Washington Ceasefire and the
National School Safety and Security Services, which we verified with information from newspaper
clippings.
We use the National School Safety Center’s definition of a deadly school shooting, which is any
homicidal or suicidal gun-related death in the United States that occurred on the property of a
functioning public, private or parochial secondary school; on the way to or from regular sessions
at such a school; while a person was attending or was on the way to or from a school-sponsored
event; or as an obvious direct result of school incidents, functions or activities, whether on or off a
school bus, school vehicle or school property.
As shown in Figure 2.1, we document 157 shootings in high schools between 1994 and 2009
that result in one or more deaths. These schools where shootings occurred contain approximately
5We use the year of the fall semester to indicate the school year. For instance, we refer to the 2001-02 school year
as 2001.
6
245,391 enrolled students, who may have suffered negative direct or indirect consequences from
the event. We do not detect any trend in the annual number of deadly shootings. Among the
157 shootings that occurred in high schools, 104 are categorized as homicidal and 53 are suicidal
incidents. Among the 104 homicidal shootings, 27 involve multiple deaths (ranging from 2 to 15
people).6
Data on school characteristics is from the Common Core of Data (CCD) from the National
Center for Education Statistics (NCES) from 1990 to 2009. The data set provides a complete
listing of all public elementary and secondary schools in the U.S. and provides basic information
and descriptive statistics on schools, their students and their teachers. We use CCD data for
enrollment per grade (grades 9 to 12) and number of teachers.7
We define our comparison group as other high schools in the same district. Schools in the
same district have many similar unobservable characteristics. As Figure 2.2 reveals, enrollment in
other schools in the same district is not negatively affected by shootings. Thus, it is very unlikely
that we double count the movement of students from schools where shootings have occurred to
comparison schools. Our estimates can be viewed as a lower bound of the true effect of school
shootings on student outcomes because the comparison schools could be influenced due to their
physical proximity, albeit at a different magnitude. Figure 2.2 shows a permanent decrease in
entrance grade 9 enrollment after a shooting takes place.
School performance data is from each state’s Department of Education website. A student’s
ability in math and English is tested at least once during high school using a standardized test.
Information is extracted from each school’s report card and from data files posted by each state’s
Department of Education. We focus on data from 2002 to 2010 due to availability. The No
Child Left Behind Act passed in 2001 requires all schools receiving federal funding to administer
a state-wide standardized test; in most states, these results are posted online. Most states only
publish the proportion of a school’s students who fall into various categories of achievement, such as
“minimum,” “basic,” “proficient” and “advanced” performance, rather than the actual mean scores
of the schools. We use the proportion of students achieving a proficient or advanced level on math
and English state-wide standardized tests for each school, which we refer to as the “proficiency
rate,” as the outcome variable.
6When a person killed someone else and then committed suicide, we categorized the incident as a homicidal
shooting. We classify accidental gun-related deaths in the homicidal category.
7There is no information on teacher turnover at the school level in the CCD.
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These tests vary from state to state but are identical within a state for any given year.8 As
Table 2.1 shows, the mean proficiency rate is not statistically different between “treated schools”
and comparison schools. Table 2.1 shows that schools that experience shootings are larger than
average, both in terms of the number of total enrolled students and in full-time equivalent teachers
(FTEs). Figures 2.3 and 2.4 display the average proficiency rate for the years before and the years
after any shooting incidents for treated schools and comparison schools, which show a decline in
the math and English proficiency rates in the years following a homicidal shooting for schools that
experienced a shooting.
In addition, we collected school-level graduation rates, average daily attendance rates and num-
bers of suspensions per 100 students for all schools in the districts that experienced shootings in
all available states.9
We use student-level data from California. The data is provided by the California Department
of Education (CDE) for 2007 to 2010. During that period, seven deadly high school shootings
occurred in seven school districts. The seven affected school districts have 195 high schools within
their boundaries and a large number of students. The data contains test results on the California
Standards Tests (CST). The CSTs, which are part of the California Standardized Testing and
Reporting (STAR) program, are taken by students from grades 2 through 11 in many subjects,
but we use only math and English results from grades 9 through 11. We have measures of the
proficiency level in math and English standardized tests for students in the seven districts. The
possible levels of math and English proficiency for students in the seven districts are: far below
basic (1), below basic (2), basic (3), proficient (4) and advanced (5). We also have information on
the sex of the students, which allows us to determine whether shootings affect males and females
differently.
8We examine the relationship between 36 high school shootings and the proportion of students achieving a
proficient- or advanced-level result on English tests in 14 states. We also examine the relationship between 34
high school shootings and the proportion of students achieving a proficient- or advanced-level result on math tests
in 13 states. Not all states have both test results posted on their Department of Education websites, which is the
reason why the sample size is different for math and English tests. English test results are from Alabama, California,
Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Washington and
Wisconsin. Math test results are from Alabama, California, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.
9We have information on graduation rates and attendance rates for shooting-affected school districts for ten
shootings in five states (Nevada, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah) and information on numbers
of suspensions per 100 students for seven shootings in three states (Nevada, North Carolina, and Tennessee).
8
2.3 Methodology
We use a difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy to analyze the effect of deadly homicidal high
school shootings. The comparison group consists of all other high schools in the same district. We
estimate
Yit = β0 + β1Afterit + β2Afterit ∗ Shootingi + µi + γt + it (2.1)
where Yit is one of several different outcome variables for school i in year t; Shootingi is a bivariate
variable that takes a value of 1 if there was ever a shooting in school i and 0 otherwise; and Afterit
is an indicator for the period after the shootings.10 The coefficient of the interaction variable
(Afterit ∗ Shootingi) is of primary interest, as it captures the casual effect of school shootings
on various outcomes. The outcomes of interest are: enrollment per grade (9 to 12), number of
teachers, proficiency rate (in math and English) and behavioral variables (graduation, suspension
and attendance rates). We include school fixed effects, µi for school i, to control for any time-
invariant school-level factors that may be correlated with shootings and the outcome variables.
School fixed effects are as helpful as many detailed control variables in the regression because
school size, racial composition and many other school characteristics do not fluctuate a lot over
short time period that the sample covers. We also include year fixed effects to control for any
national level policy changes or trends from 1994 to 2009.11 We use clustered standard errors at
the district level to incorporate the correlations among schools in the same school district. We use
a three-year window around the shooting year.12
We also present matching regression estimates based on four characteristics of the school: state,
10The “after” period is defined differently for the enrollment analysis and the proficiency rate analysis. For the
enrollment analysis, the “after” period starts the school year following the shooting, since enrollment data is typically
generated very early in the school year (usually in September or October). For proficiency rate analysis, the “after”
period starts the same year as the shooting, since the tests are usually administered towards the end of a school year.
11We tested different specifications of the model, such as using district and year fixed effects (controlling for
enrollment three years prior), which lead to similar results. Results of this specification can be provided upon
request.
12The nature of difference-in-differences estimation requires us to check whether the schools and districts have
multiple shootings over the sample period. Multiple shootings in one school or district could bias our estimates
because the “before” and “after” periods of the shootings could overlap with those of another shooting in the same
school or district. High school shootings occur only once in most school districts over the 16 school years; 103 school
districts had one shooting, 12 school districts had two shootings, and six school districts had three or more shootings.
In our analysis, additional to all initial shootings in a district, we include subsequent shootings in a district if they
are six or more years apart. We view shootings six or more years apart as distinct because almost all students who
experience a shooting leave their school within three years, which could be interpreted as the school returning to its
pre-shooting environment. Another rationale for a three-year window around the year of shootings is that using the
entire sample for the difference-in-differences estimator will contain noise in years far from the shooting incidents.
This leads us to use a three-year window sample for all analysis.
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area (city, suburb, town or rural), size of school and number of teachers. Using these variables,
Kernel, Caliper and Nearest Neighbor matching estimators are employed.
We use student-level data and condition on having a test result before and after a shooting
at the same school. This analysis identify whether negative effects of school shootings result from
students being directly affected by shootings or from a composition effect (e.g. students with a high
level of achievement might not stay or register at a school after a shooting).13 We use a similar
empirical strategy for student-level data as for school-level data, so that we can exploit the panel
aspect of the data at the student level. We estimate conditional logit models with student-level
fixed effects. The primary outcome variables of interest are whether a student is proficient in
English and math standardized tests (whether the student achieves level 4 or 5 in California).
We also investigate the possibility that shootings have heterogeneous effects in two ways. First,
we investigate whether shootings affect students in various parts of the test-score distribution
differently. To study the most affected part of the distribution, we change the outcome variables
in the same regression to the probability of being in level 2 to 5, level 3 to 5, and level 5 to identify
which part of the distribution is generating the lower level of test results in schools that experienced
a shooting. Second, we study whether males are affected differently than females.
2.4 Results
Table 2.2 reveals that schools where homicidal shootings have occurred experience a decline in
grade 9 enrollment relative to other schools in the same district.14 Table 2.2 shows that a shooting
reduces enrollment in grade 9 by 28 students on average, which represents a 5.8 percent decline
in grade 9 enrollment for the average school experiencing a shooting. This decrease in grade 9
enrollment represents a large change in school selection by students entering high school. One
possible explanation for the large decline in grade 9 enrollment is that middle school students and
their parents try to avoid the school that had the shooting.15
Enrollment in other grades and the number of teachers employed do not show a statistically
13Similar results are found if we restrict the sample to two observations per student, one before and one after a
shooting (balanced panel).
14We use a subset of high schools for the enrollment analysis, which is high schools where the lowest grade is
grade 9 and highest grade is grade 12, to ensure a clear interpretation of the coefficient. Among the 157 high school
shootings, 136 occurred in high schools that have grades 9 through 12 over the sample period. Results are robust to
the inclusion of all high schools.
15Smith et al. (2012), for example, find that parents and students change enrollment decisions in response to
negative news about schools.
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significant change after a shooting.16 The fact that enrollment for grades 10, 11 and 12 does not
significantly change the following year after a shooting suggests that continuing students in schools
experiencing a shooting have established connections that raise the cost of transferring to another
school. It is also likely to be administratively difficult for continuing students to transfer.
Table 2.3 presents regression results for enrollment in grades 10 and 11, excluding either the
first year or the first two years after a shooting. It shows that a decrease in enrollment for the
entrance grade (grade 9) immediately following a shooting is followed by a decrease in the number
of student enrolled in grade 10 (after one year) and grade 11 (after two years).
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.4 show that the proficiency rate decreases after homicidal shooting
incidents in those schools relative to comparison schools. Table 2.4 indicates that the proficiency
rate in math is reduced by 4.9 percentage points, which means that the proficiency rate in math
decreased by 9.3 percent for the average school experiencing a shooting. For English standard-
ized tests, the effect of shootings is of a slightly smaller magnitude, 3.9 percentage points lower
than the comparison schools. This means that in the average school experiencing a shooting, 6.2
percent fewer students achieve a “proficient” or “advanced” level on their English standardized
tests. Columns 3 to 5 of Table 2.4 show the causal effect of deadly shootings on graduation rates,
average daily attendance rates and the number of suspensions per 100 students. We do not find
any statistically significant results for all three outcomes.
Table 2.5 presents results for the impact of suicidal shootings on outcome variables: enrollment
per grade (9 to 12), number of teachers, and the proficiency rate in math and English standardized
tests.17 Suicidal shootings can be an important aspect of school shootings as Lang (2013) finds that
gun ownership rate is positively associated with firearm suicide rate. However, Table 2.5 shows
that suicidal shootings have no significant impact on any outcome of interest.18
Comparing these results with significant change driven by homicidal shootings, it is clear that
homicidal and suicidal shootings have different effect on educational outcomes. Common aspect
between two types of fatal shootings are death of a member in the school. Difference is that
homicidal shootings bring additional fear to students caused by trauma of terror. These combined
results suggest that the trauma of terror and possibility of victimization is the main mechanism
16We do not have information on teacher turnover in the data. It is possible that some teachers leave after a
shooting and are replaced by younger teachers. An alternative approach would be to use the student to teacher ratio
as an outcome variable. The coefficient for the student to teacher ratio is positive but not significant. Results are
available upon request.
17We do not have enough observations to study behavioral outcomes for suicidal shootings.
18The sample size is smaller than homicidal shootings and standard errors are bigger.
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generating the negative effect of fatal shootings in high schools.
Results from the school-level analysis indicate that a large number of students are likely to
change their school selection due to school shootings. This implies that identified school-level effect
is a total effect, which is a sum of compositional change and individual effect. Total effect has
high policy relevance, however, separating the individual effect will allow us to isolate the true
shock on students’ educational outcomes from school shootings. Individual effect is identified by
using student-level data and by conditioning on students staying in the same schools after shooting
incidents.
Using California student-level data, Table 2.6 shows 4.2 and 10.2 percentage point decreases
in the probability of achieving a proficient-level result (achievement level 4 or 5 in California) in
math and English, respectively. These results suggest that the decrease in test scores is not solely
due to composition effect, e.g. fewer high-achieving students attending schools where shootings
occurred.19 Also, student-level results control for student transfers to other schools that could
generate an upward bias in the school-level results if high-achieving students are more likely to
transfer out of the schools where shootings have occurred.20 This allows us to conclude that
students’ academic achievement worsens after fatal shooting incidents in high schools.
Individual effect identified by student-level analysis shows that students’ math and English test
scores are directly affected by school shootings. These results confirm that effect of school shootings
are coming from both compositional change and individual effect. Also, this suggests that academic
aspects should be helped in addition to other counselings provided to students in the aftermath of
shootings.
Table 2.7 identifies the effect of shootings on the probability of reaching various achievement
levels. It shows that shootings have heterogeneous effects on math standardized test results. For
math tests, the negative effects are concentrated on students who are at the high achievement part
of the distribution. The negative effect of shootings on the probability of reaching achievement
level 5 in math tests is large, 10.4 percentage points, which is as large as English test results. The
magnitude of the effect of shootings decreases as the achievement level of interest goes down, almost
disappearing when looking at the probability of achieving level 3 or higher. However, the negative
effect is consistent throughout the distribution for English test results. Lastly, when we analyze
19The results are similar when we restrict the sample to students who stay in the same school district as well as to
those who do not repeat a grade.
20Estimates from the student-level data is an intent-to-treat (ITT) estimate because we do not have daily attendance
data on the day of the shooting.
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the effects of shooting by gender, we find that male and female students are both similarly affected
by shootings with respect to their English test results (see Table 2.8). Shootings negatively affect
math test results for females, but not for males.
2.5 Robustness
We do several tests to ensure that our results are robust and valid. First, we conduct a random-
ization of the shooting incidents. We randomize the shootings within the school districts for the
year the shooting took place and re-run baseline regressions for our main outcome variables: the
proficiency rate in math and English, as well as enrollment in grade 9. The rationale behind this
randomization is to provide confidence that our significant results are not caused by a factor other
than the shootings. We do 1,000 replications and find that it is unlikely that the results are found
by random chance. Figure 2.5 and 2.6 present histograms of t values and coefficients by intervals
for our main variable of interest. Results from this randomization and these figures give additional
confidence to our results.
Second, our results are robust to alternate specifications, such as using district fixed effects
instead of school fixed effects. Results are also robust to alternative standard error clustering, such
as clustering at the state level or using a block bootstrap specification at the state level.
Third, we check that our results are not driven by extreme shooting incidents where multiple
people die (the effect on students could arguably be higher in these cases). Restricting the sample
to school shootings where only one person dies leads to a similar conclusion for the proficiency rates
on math and English standardized tests as well as enrollment in grade 9.
Fourth, in Table 2.9, we also present matching regression estimates based on state, area (city,
suburb, town or rural), size of school and number of teachers. We get similar estimates from three
types of matching estimates (Kernel, Caliper and Nearest Neighbor) but larger coefficients than
our main results. This implies that our preferred estimates could be a lower bound of the true
effect of deadly school shootings on educational outcomes.
2.6 Conclusions
We analyze the causal effect of deadly shooting incidents in high schools on educational outcomes.
We find that enrollment declines in grade 9 (the high school entrance grade) in schools that ex-
perience homicidal shootings. Furthermore, math and English standardized test proficiency rates
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drop significantly in schools that experience a shooting. However, we do not find a detrimental
effect of shootings on suspension, graduation or average daily attendance rates. We find that there
is no significant impact for suicidal shootings. To settle whether students are directly affected by
shootings or if it is rather a composition effect, we use student-level data from California. We
find that students are directly affected by shootings. There is a decrease in probability of being at
proficiency level 4 or 5 (a high achievement level) for math and English standardized tests.
The negative effect of shootings on student achievement on math and English standardized
tests is an important factor in determining wages and employment for these students in the long-
run. If students attending schools that experienced a shooting have lower test scores, they might
be accepted into less selective colleges, which could lead to lower earnings later in life (Hoekstra,
2009). Moreover, several studies document the links between student performance and labor market
outcomes at adulthood. Neal and Johnson (1996) find that scores from tests administered between
the ages of 14 and 21 are highly significant predictors of wages at age 26 to 29. Murnane, Willett
and Levy (1995) show that test scores from one’s senior year of high school are related to wages at
age 24. Currie and Thomas (2001) find that a one standard deviation increase in test scores at age
16 translates into a higher wage rate and higher probability of being employed at age 33. Thus,
even though we are looking at the short-run impact, school shootings are likely to have long-run
negative effects on students. Future research should try to answer this question.
Our estimates indicate that students, on average, are highly affected when there is a homicidal
shooting. These results indicate that policy makers should consider providing extra support to all
students in schools where a shooting occurs. It also suggests that more effort should be invested
in preventive measures such as gun control (Duggan, 2001; Marvell, 2001; Lott and Whitley, 2001)
and more resources should be made available to students (Carrell and Hoekstra, 2011), especially
in the aftermath of shootings. More research should be done regarding the negative effect of high
school shootings, such as on the long-term effects of shootings on students since there are direct
and indirect burden of crime for students and the entire nation (Anderson, 1999).
2.7 Figures and Tables
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Figure 2.1: Number of Shootings By Type of Shooting
Source: Report on School Associated Violent Deaths from the National School Safety Center (2010),
Washington Ceasefire, and the National School Safety and Security Services.
Figure 2.2: The Effect of Shootings on Grade 9 Enrollment (Entrance Grade)
Source: Common Core of Data (CCD) from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).
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Figure 2.3: The Effect of Shootings on math Proficiency Rate
Source: Information was extracted from each school’s report card and from data files posted by each state’s
Department of Education.
Figure 2.4: The Effect of Shootings on English Proficiency Rate
Source: Information was extracted from each school’s report card and from data files posted by each state’s
Department of Education.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics - High Schools before a shooting
All Shooting Schools Comparison Schools
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Enrollment in
Grade 9 486 283 436 344
Grade 10 426 238 378 289
Grade 11 352 196 314 240
Grade 12 298 171 262 202
Total Students 1587 835 1408 1044
FTE Teachers 80 37 73 47
English 65.4 23.0 60.5 27.9
Math 57.8 24.3 52.9 28.6
Graduation Rate 71.5 13.6 72.3 17.8
Attendance Rate 92.8 3.5 91.3 3.9
Suspension Rate 19.6 17.7 18.3 18.0
Note: Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for key variables for
shooting schools and our comparison schools for the three years be-
fore the shooting. Enrollment and teacher variables are from the
Common Core of Data. Test results and behavioral variables are
from school report cards. Only high schools with grades 9 to 12 are
included in the enrollment and teacher sample. All high schools are
included in the test results and behavioral sample. Math and En-
glish variables are the proficiency rate from standardized tests. FTE
Teachers are full time equivalent teachers. Suspension rate is num-
ber of suspensions per 100 students. The comparison schools are all
other schools in the shooting district. Using a t-test or Wilcoxson
test, we find that shooting schools are statistically different in terms
of students (grade 9 to 12 and total students) and number of teachers
but not for proficiency in English and math, as well as graduation,
attendance, and suspension rates.
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of t-values from Randomization for Enrollment in Grade 9, English, and
Math
Figure 2.6: Distribution of Coefficients from Randomization for Enrollment in grade 9, English,
and math. Verticical line represents estimates from our main specification.
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Table 2.2: The Effect of Homicidal Shootings on Enrollment
Enrollment in Grade # of
9 10 11 12 Total Teachers
After -3.48 -6.46 -8.08** 0.92 -14.27 0.57
(7.03) (4.51) (4.09) (2.62) (12.61) (1.25)
After*Shooting School -28.41*** -8.84 6.96 -3.71 -37.79 -1.78
(10.92) (8.37) (9.30) (6.69) (23.97) (1.28)
Observations 5,385 5,386 5,394 5,392 5,397 5,222
R-squared 0.842 0.890 0.875 0.850 0.941 0.901
Note: Table 2.2 presents difference-in-differences regression estimates for the
number of student in grades 9 to 12 and the number of teachers. The coefficient
of interest is After*Shooting School. We use clustered standard errors at the
district level. Coefficients for school and year fixed effects are not shown. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Common Core of Data (CCD) from the National Center for Education
Statistics (NCES).
Table 2.3: The Effect of Shootings on enrollment for future
years
VARIABLES Grade10 Grade11 Total Total
After 1.201 -2.881 3.982 -9.118
(6.251) (9.900) (24.09) (34.38)
After*Shooting School -41.40* -35.92* -130.2* -196.0**
(22.28) (21.81) (75.40) (83.04)
EXCLUDED 1st Yr Y Y Y Y
EXCLUDED 2nd Yr Y Y
Observations 5,173 4,335 5,192 4,345
R-squared 0.437 0.438 0.462 0.468
Note: Table A.1 presents difference-in-differences regression es-
timates for the number of students in grades 10 and 11, and
the total number of students, by excluding the first year or the
first two years after a shooting. The coefficient of interest is Af-
ter*Shooting School. We use clustered standard errors at the dis-
trict level. Coefficients for school and year fixed effects are not
shown. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Common Core of Data (CCD) from the National Center
for Education Statistics (NCES).
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Table 2.4: The Effect of Homicidal Shootings on Test Results and Behavioral
Variables
Fraction Proficient in Rate of
Math English Graduation Attendance Suspension
After -3.48 -3.52** 0.81 -1.29*** 1.02
(2.31) (1.58) (1.34) (0.46) (1.34)
After*Shooting School -4.92*** -3.93*** 0.40 0.62 -2.28
(1.18) (1.07) (1.19) (0.39) (1.55)
Observations 1,412 1,425 566 501 462
R-squared 0.606 0.668 0.254 0.366 0.669
Note: Table 2.4 presents difference-in-difference regression estimates for math and English
proficiency rate, graduation, attendance and suspension rates. The coefficient of interest is
After*Shooting School. We use clustered standard errors at the district level. Coefficients
for school and year fixed effects are not shown. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Test results and other variables are extracted from each school’s report card and
from data files posted by each state’s Department of Education.
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Table 2.5: The Effect of Suicidal Shootings
Enrollment in Grade
9 10 11 12
After -2.04 -8.50 -1.16 2.02
(10.31) (6.99) (5.02) (3.51)
After*Shooting School 22.70 -2.69 3.77 0.88
(17.61) (14.03) (14.41) (8.52)
Total Number of Fraction Proficient in
Students Teachers Math English
After -13.25 0.48 -3.39 0.64
(17.19) (0.78) (10.18) (7.08)
After*Shooting School 26.59 0.09 7.50 -5.59
(39.16) (1.49) (10.59) (6.29)
Note: Table 2.5 investigates the effect of suicidal shootings. We run re-
gressions for enrollment per grade, number of teachers, proficiency in
math and English and behavioral outcomes for suicidal shootings. The
coefficient of interest is After*Shooting School. We use clustered stan-
dard errors at the district level. Coefficients for school and year fixed
effects are not shown. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Enrollment data are from the Common Core of Data (CCD)
from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). Test results
and other variables are extracted from each school’s school report card
and from data files posted by each state’s Department of Education.
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Table 2.6: The Effect of Shootings using California Student Level
Data - 2007-2011
Probability of Proficiency Level in
Math(Level 4 or 5) English (Level 4 or 5)
After -0.079*** -0.015
(0.010) (0.009)
After*Shooting School -0.042** -0.102***
(0.017) (0.017)
Observations 246,864 270,114
Number of Students 120,924 125,949
Note: Table 2.6 investigates the impact of shootings on students using
student-level data from the California Department of Education. Using
conditional fixed effects logit models with student-level fixed effects, we
study the probability of students achieving level 4 or 5 in math and En-
glish. The sample is restricted to students who took tests both before
and after a shooting. The level of math and English proficiency for stu-
dents in the 7 districts are: far below basic (1), below basic (2), basic
(3), proficient (4), and advanced (5).To correct for autocorrelation, we
cluster errors at the district level. Estimates for student and year fixed
effects are not shown. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Student-level data from California provided by the California
Department of Education (CDE).
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Table 2.7: The Effect of Shootings on Cumulative Level of Achieve-
ment
Probability of Student Reaching Achievement Level
2, 3, 4, or 5 3, 4 or 5 4 or 5 5
Math Test 0.005 -0.012 -0.042** -0.104***
(0.015) (0.012) (0.017) (0.039)
English Test -0.106*** -0.116*** -0.102*** -0.104***
(0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019)
Note: Table 2.7 investigates the distributional impact of shootings on
students using student-level data from the California Department of Ed-
ucation. Using conditional fixed effects logit models with student-level
fixed effects, we study the probability of students achieving various lev-
els on math and English tests after a shooting. The sample is restricted
to students who took tests both before and after a shooting. The level of
math and English proficiency for students in the 7 districts are: far be-
low basic (1), below basic (2), basic (3), proficient (4), and advanced (5).
Column 1 estimates the probability of reaching achievement level 2, 3, 4,
or 5 after the shooting. As we move right from column 1, the remaining
columns restrict the outcome to higher levels of achievement. The coef-
ficient of interest is After*Shooting School for math and English tests.
Estimates for student and year fixed effects are not shown. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Student-level data from California provided by the California
Department of Education (CDE).
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Table 2.8: The Effect of Shootings by Gender using Student-Level
Data
Male Students Probability of Achieving Proficiency in
Math (Level 4 or 5) English (Level 4 or 5)
After -0.062*** -0.010
(0.014) (0.013)
After*Shooting School -0.030 -0.094***
(0.023) (0.024)
Observations 125,649 138,731
Number of Students 62,238 65,190
Female Students Probability of Achieving Proficiency in
Math (Level 4 or 5) English (Level 4 or 5)
After -0.098*** -0.020
(0.015) (0.013)
After*Shooting School -0.054** -0.110***
(0.024) (0.024)
Observations 121,215 131,383
Number of Students 58,755 60,841
Note: Table 2.8 investigates the impact of shootings on students by gen-
der using student-level data from the California Department of Educa-
tion. Using conditional fixed effects logit models with student-level fixed
effects, we study the probability of students reaching level 4 or 5 on math
and English tests. The sample is restricted to students who took tests
both before and after a shooting. Estimates for student and year fixed
effects are not shown. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Student-level data from California provided by the California De-
partment of Education (CDE).
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Table 2.9: The Effect of Homicidal









Nearest Neighbor -7.79*** -5.15*
(3.58) (3.13)
Note: Table 2.9 presents matching regres-
sion estimates for math and English profi-
ciency rate. Matching regressions are based
on state, area (city, suburb, town or rural),
size of school and number of teachers. Ta-
ble 2.9 presents three type of matching esti-
mates: Kernel, Caliper and Nearest Neigh-
bor. The reported coefficient is the vari-
able of interest: the shooting variable. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Test results and other variables are
extracted from each school’s report card and




The Effect of Violent Crime on
Educational Attainment
Identifying the determinants of educational attainment, especially for students on the margin of
deciding to continue high school or enroll in college, has strong policy and social implications.
For these students, differences in educational attainment may have significant effects on long-term
outcomes, including labor market outcomes. Many of those on the margin live in disadvantageous
neighborhoods, where violent crime is often a more common occurrence and may have a detrimental
effect on students. Thus, in this paper, I study the effect of violent crime on educational attainment.
I identify the effect of violent crime on educational attainment using two approaches that rely
on different identification assumptions. Specifically, the two different methods I use are (1) a city
fixed-effects model that exploits different trends among 229 major cities over several decades and (2)
an instrumental variable model that uses an exogenous shock in violent crime generated by welfare
reform. Since each model relies on different identification assumptions, similar results from the two
models will provide compelling evidence for policymakers on both educational and non-educational
policies.
First, a city fixed effects model with city-specific linear trends identifies the causal effect of
changes in crime on changes in educational outcomes by exploiting different trends in violent crime
rates among 229 major cities in the U.S. over several decades. In this fixed effects model, I use
the total number of students enrolled in high schools, grades 9 to 12, as a measure of educational
attainment in these cities. Second, I use implementation of the Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT)
program — a change in delivery of welfare payments from paper checks to debit cards — as an
26
instrument. The program was implemented as a part of the Welfare Reform Act of 1996 to achieve
efficiency in payment delivery. As a result, EBT implementation reduced cash circulation in poor
neighborhoods, which, in turn, lowered violent crime rates (Wright et al. 2014). This provides an
exogenous shock to violent crime rates that allows this study to estimate the effect of violent crime
on educational attainment.
The two estimates from two different methods show a negative effect of violent crime on edu-
cational attainment. The estimates from the fixed effects model identify the negative relationship
between violent crimes and enrollment level in high schools. The results indicate that violent crime
has a statistically significant negative correlation with enrollment in grade 12, when most students
are eligible to drop out of high school. The same association with grade 9 enrollment is not signif-
icant and this difference suggests that student drop-out drives the decline in enrollment associated
with a high violent crime rate. This relationship is robust to the inclusion of city-specific linear
time trends and time-varying controls including the local unemployment rate and demographic
variables.
The instrumental variable model results also show a negative effect of violent crime on educa-
tional attainment. Using the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97), two-stage
least squares (2SLS) estimates indicate that higher violent crime rates make it more likely that a
student will drop out of high school and less likely that a student will enroll in college. Specifically,
a 10 percent increase in the violent crime rate increases the probability of dropping out of high
school by 1.3 percentage points. Furthermore, a 10 percent increase in the violent crime rate lowers
the likelihood of enrolling in a post-secondary institution by 4.2 percentage points.
Building on extant literature that studies the role of various inputs in the educational pro-
duction function, the results of this study suggest an additional factor: violence. Previous papers
investigated the effect of school and teacher quality as well as expenditures and intervention pro-
grams such as Head Start (Dearden, Ferri and Meghir 2002; Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff 2014;
Garces, Thomas and Currie 2002; Cascio, Gordon and Reber 2013). Furthermore, Brown and
Taylor (2008) and Jacob (2004) find that bullying experiences and the closure of public housing
increase the probability of low educational attainment.
The identified negative effect of violent crime on educational attainment has long-lasting effects
because educational attainment affects lifetime earnings and even adult mortality. Especially for
low-performing students, the decision whether to drop out makes a large difference in earnings,
even compared with recipients of a general educational development (GED) certification (Murnane
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2013; Murnane, Willett, and Tyler 2000; Cameron and Heckman 1993).1 Also, marginal student’s
decision to enroll in a post-secondary institution will significantly affect their labor market out-
comes. Zimmerman (2014) finds that academically marginal students experience earning gains of
22 percent after enrollment in colleges. In addition, Lleras-Muney (2005) shows that educational
attainment has a causal effect on adult mortality.
This study also adds to the literature that identifies the economic consequences of crime by
focusing on crime’s impact on educational outcomes. My analysis indicates that even in the absence
of direct personal exposure, living in areas with high violent crime rates influences educational
attainment and human capital accumulation. My results are consistent with Sharkey (2010) and
Sharkey et al. (2014), who find that homicide and violent crime in close proximity to student
residences reduce those students’ achievement on assessments. Beland and Kim (2014) also find
that fatal shootings in high schools lower student achievement for those enrolled in these high
schools.
This paper complements and augments the literature on the effect of education on crime by
investigating an earlier time in a person’s life. Relatively few attempts are made to estimate the
effect of crime on educational outcomes, and this study contributes to the literature by answering
this question. Research documents that additional education decreases the likelihood of committing
crime in the future (Buonanno and Leonida 2009; Machin, Marie and Vujic 2011). Lochner and
Moretti (2004), especially, show that more years of schooling significantly reduces the probability
of incarceration later in life.
The results of this paper provide two distinct policy implications by quantifying the negative
effect of violent crime on educational outcomes. First, identifying the effect of violent crime on
educational outcomes would provide evidence that non-educational policies can affect educational
outcomes. Since policymakers in the criminal justice system may use various policies to reduce
crime, the results of this paper sheds light on the importance of coordinating educational and
non-educational policies to enhance student educational outcomes. Second, the existence of a
spillover effect of violent crime would provide additional evidence for policymakers to consider
when determining the optimal level of policing. If the identified magnitude of the effect of violent
crime on educational outcomes is not considered, policymakers may decide to under-provide the
level of policing.
1Clark and Martorell (2014), through comparing those who barely passed and those who barely failed high school
exit exams, find little evidence of a high school diploma signaling effect.
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This paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the mechanisms, section 3 shows fixed
effects estimates, section 4 presents results from an instrumental variable analysis and section 5
concludes.
3.1 Violent Crime as Causal Mechanism
Among many influential educational inputs, violent crime is an important factor for educational
outcomes. I include violent crime as one element of community factors in the educational production
function. Heuristically, we can write the educational production function as:
Educational Outcomes = f(School Inputs, Family Inputs, Community Factors) (3.1)
which implies that the educational outcomes are determined by inputs such as school quality,
teacher quality, family background, and various community factors (Coleman et al. 1966). My
study focuses on one such community factor — crime. A 2012 survey shows that students aged
twelve through eighteen experience 90 victimizations per 1,000 students at school or away from
school (Robers et al. 2014). This section describes suggested potential mechanisms of how violent
crime can affect educational outcomes and summarizes the existing literature.
Violent crimes may affect educational attainment of individuals due to changes in mental health
of students or changes in student behaviors. The first mechanism captures the effect of violent crime
on educational outcomes through reduced mental health (Dustmann and Fasani 2013; Ding et al.
2009; Currie and Stabile 2006). The second explains how the occurrence of crimes can lead to
actual student behavioral changes that eventually affect their school outcomes (Robers et al. 2014;
Goodman 2014).
Personal exposure to violent crime in school and outside school boundaries can adversely affect
mental health and thus educational outcomes for students. Victims or witnesses of violent crimes
experience an extreme shock that can potentially lead to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
Berman et al. (1996) find that students who have been exposed to violent crimes show a greater
number of PTSD symptoms. Among those who were exposed to a violent crime, 44.3 percent were
categorized as having “moderate” PTSD symptoms and 18.6 percent as “severe” PTSD symptoms.2
Berman et al. find that victims and witnesses exhibit a similar number of PTSD symptoms.
Likewise, Pynoos et al. (1987) find that elementary school students experienced PTSD after a fatal
2The categorization is based on the Frederick scoring system of the PTSD Reaction Index (PTSD-RI).
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sniper attack on their school playground.3 The severity of PTSD was worse for all exposure levels
if the students knew the victim well. However, they find no difference in severity by age, sex or
ethnicity.
Building on evidence that violent crime causes PTSD, McEwen and Sapolsky (1995) demon-
strate that PTSD increases the frequency of declarative errors but has no effect on tasks that
have fewer declarative and more procedural components. Declarative knowledge involves explicit
knowledge of a fact, whereas procedural knowledge is implicit knowledge of how to do something.
Furthermore, there are papers hypothesizing PTSD has an effect on educational outcomes. Beland
and Kim (2014) identify that fatal high school shootings reduce the standardized test results of
students in schools where shootings happened relative to those in other high schools in the same
district. Sharkey (2010) and Sharkey et al. (2014) find that students in Chicago and New York City
have lower achievements after experiencing violent crime in close proximity to student residences
within a week of the assessment.
Students can be influenced not only through personal exposure but also through the level of
violence prevalent in the local area. Even without ties to specific incidents, the aggregate level of
violent crime can generate fear and stress for individuals. An increase in the danger individuals
perceive in their environment leads to stress and other mental health issues (Stafford, Chandola
and Marmot 2007; Cornaglia, Feldman and Leigh 2014; Metcalfe, Powdthavee and Dolan 2011).
Dustmann and Fasani (2013) show that local crime rates have a negative effect on mental health,
mostly through depression and anxiety, and Becker and Rubinstein (2011) provide evidence that
major crime incidents, such as terrorist acts, inflict harm by creating fear and altering behaviors.
Following the negative effect of local crime on mental health, poor mental health reduces ed-
ucational outcomes. Ding et al. (2009) identify the impact of poor mental health on academic
achievement using a set of genetic markers for depression as instruments. They find that depres-
sion causes one standard deviation decrease in GPA or 0.45 points. Currie and Stabile (2006) find
that poor mental health impairs educational outcomes, and Currie (2009) reviews the findings of
other papers.
The violent crime rate is a proxy for the prevalence of violence in a local area: a high crime
rate indicates a greater probability of being a victim of violent crime, which, in turn, can alter an
individual’s behavior. The prevalence of violence can discourage students from regularly attending
3On Feb 24, 1984, a sniper began firing from a second-story window across the street from an elementary school
at children on the school playground. Two children were killed and 13 were injured.
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school, thus increasing their absences, which, in turn, lowers educational outcomes. Robers et al.
(2014) find that 2 percent of students age twelve to eighteen avoided at least one school activity
due to fear of an attack or harm in 2011.4 Goodman (2014) identifies that school absence hinders
students from following the curriculum and learning effectively, reducing math achievement.
The crime rate can also be positively correlated with drug use, which distracts students from
school. Increased drug use can lower a student’s ability to perform in school, and creates the need
to participate in criminal activity to acquire drugs or to supply drugs. This dual increase in crime
rates and drug use can decrease educational outcomes. Evans, Garthwaite and Moore (2013) find
that the emergence of the crack market decreased black male high school graduation rates from
the early 1980s to the mid-1990s. However, Figure 3.1, which describe the National Youth Risk
Behavior Survey (YRBS) data, shows that the proportion of students using various types of drugs
did not increase over the sample period after the mid-1990s.
Other disadvantageous neighborhood attributes affect both crime rates and educational out-
comes. For example, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) and Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002)
identify high unemployment rates as large drivers of crime rates. This leads me to include the un-
employment rate in the model. However, the coefficients for the unemployment rate indicate that
the unemployment rate does not significantly affect the relationship between crime and educational
outcomes.
3.2 Fixed Effects Model using Aggregate Data
If neighborhoods are randomly assigned different crime rates, estimating the effect of violent crime
on educational outcomes using a linear regression model is not difficult. The equation is:
Educaional Outcomejt = V iolent Crime Ratejtβ +Xjtγ + jt (3.2)
where Educaional Outcomejt represents educational outcomes of city j in year t and V iolent Crime
Ratejt represents the log violent crime per 100,000 people of city j in year t. The parameter of
interest is β, the causal effect of violent crime on educational outcomes. For consistent estimation
of β, the crime rate must not be correlated with unobservable that influence educational outcome
conditional on covariates, which means: Cov(Crimejt, jt|Xjt) = 0.
4“Avoided school activities” include avoiding any (extracurricular) activities, skipping class or staying home from
school.
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Despite the importance of studying the relationship between crime and educational outcomes,
many difficulties arise when a researcher attempts to identify the causal effect of violent crime on
educational outcomes with non-experimental data. The key methodological challenge inherent in
using non-experimental data for this research question is to separate the causal effect of crime on
educational outcomes from other factors, such as school inputs and family inputs. Even conditional
on observable characteristics, the correlation between the violent crime rate and the error term
remains. This problem arises because disadvantaged neighborhoods share high crime rates, poor
schooling and poor labor market outcomes.
One approach the literature has used is to employ data from programs that randomly assign fam-
ilies to low poverty neighborhoods. These experiments re-locate a small proportion of households to
different neighborhoods without changing the existing neighborhood’s characteristics. There have
been two major randomized experiments in the U.S. that tested whether neighborhood environ-
ments, including violence, affect children’s opportunities in life. Rosenbaum (1995) shows youth
relocated to the suburbs do better on several educational measures using the Gautreaux program
in Chicago that relocated more than 5,000 families in 1981 to middle-income white suburbs or to
low-income, mostly-black urban areas. Another residential mobility experiment, Moving to Oppor-
tunity (MTO), was conducted by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in five
cities, enrolling 4,600 households since 1994.5 Among multiple papers analyzing MTO, Sanbon-
matsu et al. (2006) find no overall statistically significant impacts on reading or math test scores
for children in MTO 4-7 years after relocation.
The city fixed effects model identifies the effect of violent crime on educational attainment by
exploiting the different trends in violent crime rates among 229 major cities in the U.S. over several
decades. For example, the 12 largest cities in the U.S. show different trends in violent crime rates
in Figure 3.2. Equation 3.3 includes city and year fixed effects conditional on covariates as well as
city-specific linear trends. Specifically, the estimated model takes the form:
Yjt = Crimejtβ + µj + ζt + θjt+Xjtγ + jt (3.3)
where Yjt is the log of total number of enrolled high school students of city j in year t, Crimejt is
the log violent crime rate per 100,000 people of city j in year t, µj are city fixed effects to control
for time-invariant city characteristics, ζt are year fixed effects to capture changes occurring to all
cities in year t, θjt are city-specific time trends to control for linearly trending characteristics, Xjt
5Five MTO cities are Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles and New York.
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are additional time-varying characteristics of the city and jt is an error term.
6 All standard errors
are clustered at the state level to account for the possible correlation of errors among cities located
in the same state as well as among different time periods for a given city.
There are two main threats to the internal validity of this model: omitted variable bias and
reverse causality. No method accounts perfectly for the omitted variable; however, a city-specific
linear trend will capture linearly trending unobservable characteristics that are correlated with the
crime rate. Regarding reverse causality, it could be the case that dropouts commit crime and cause
the positive relationship between the two. This can be partly addressed in the model by using
arrest numbers for people under eighteen as an additional control variable in one of the robustness
checks.
3.2.1 City and Community Aggregate Data
The crime information comes from Part 1 offenses of the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. The UCR reports crimes in two categories: violent crime and
property crime. Violent crime includes aggravated assault, forcible rape, murder and robbery, and
property crime includes arson, burglary, larceny-theft and motor vehicle theft. The crime rate is
defined as the logarithm of known offenses per 100,000 in a population following the convention in
the literature (Gould, Weinberg and Mustard 2002).7 For the fixed effects models using city-level
data, crime variables are city aggregates of law-enforcement-agency-level UCR reports as shown in
Table 3.1 from 1975 to 2010. In addition, instrumental variable analysis employs state-level UCR
data because county-level UCR data has well known imputation errors and is not suitable for use
(Maltz and Targonski 2002).
Fixed effects models with aggregate educational outcomes allow the use of various educational
outcomes in association with violent crime rates for this analysis, such as test scores and enrollment
levels. Enrollment analysis uses two different data sets: city-level data from cities with populations
above 100,000 in 2000 and community-area-level data from Chicago. Test score analyses use the
National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) state-level information.
Enrollment in cities is aggregated from the Common Core of Data (CCD), published by the
National Center for Education Statistics. The CCD school district data has basic information
6Additional control variables are age distribution (using the proportion of the sample in five different age groups;
ten to nineteen, twenty to twenty-nine, thirty to thirty-nine, forty to forty-nine, and fifty and more), sex composition,
racial composition (proportion of the sample that is black and proportion of the sample that is neither white nor
black) and unemployment rates for city j in year t.
7The yearly population measure is generated by the fitted values from the local linear regression.
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about public schools in each district, such as the number of enrolled students and the location of
the districts. I match the CCD from 1986 to 2010 to the city-level UCR data by extracting school
districts located in 229 cities. Using the address of each district office, the CCD is aggregated up
to a city level for the number of enrolled students in grades nine through twelve. Enrollment sizes
decrease as high school grades climb because more students reach an age that allows them to drop
out of high school.
It is not obvious what the correct unit of analysis should be, so I move to use community areas in
Chicago as a new unit of analysis. Chicago community-area-level data is from the City of Chicago
Data Portal. Information on all incidents of crime and total number of students enrolled in high
schools from 2001 to present is available. Then these variables are aggregated to 77 community areas
that cover the city of Chicago, shown in Table 3.2.8 Table 3.2 shows that high school enrollment
size is not statistically different in community areas with high crime rates than in those with low
crime rates.
Student academic performance data are from the National Center for Education Statistics’
National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), a standardized test of a nationally repre-
sentative sample of students in roughly two-year intervals. In addition to the analysis of educational
attainment, analyzing standardized test scores sheds light on the relationship between crime and
other educational outcomes. This paper specifically focuses on reading and mathematics assess-
ments administered to fourth and eighth graders for all 50 states and the District of Columbia from
1992-2011.9 The state-level average scores are reported for all students as well as for subgroups
of students by gender and race. For ease of interpretation, standardized state-level assessment
scores are used for the analysis.10 Table 3.3 shows the mean and standard deviation of reading and
mathematics assessments in 50 states and the District of Columbia over multiple years, as well as
the student-level standard deviation.
3.2.2 The Negative Association between Violent Crime and High School Enrollment
Columns three and four of Table 3.4 show that enrollment in grades eleven and twelve decreases
when the violent crime rate increases. The estimation results of Equation (3.3) from 229 cities’
8A community area is a unit within the city of Chicago that is the basis for a variety of urban planning initiatives
on both the local and regional levels as shown in Figure 3.3. Community area is from the work of the Social Science
Research Committee at the University of Chicago, which divides Chicago into 77 areas.
9Reading test results are available for 1992, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011. Mathematics test
results are available for 1992, 1996, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011.
10Following the convention, the individual student-level standard deviation is used for the standardization instead
of the state-level or city-level standard deviation.
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city-level data show that crime rate elasticity of enrollment in grade eleven is -0.017 and is -0.037
for grade twelve. In other words, a 10 percent increase in the violent crime rate is associated with
about a 0.2 percent decline in grade eleven enrollment and a 0.4 percent decline in grade twelve
enrollment.11 City-specific linear trends eliminate variation in crime rates caused by city-specific
factors and change linearly over time. In contrast, columns one and two show that coefficients for
enrollment in grades nine and ten are not statistically different from zero.
Any differences in coefficients found in the enrollment analysis for grades eleven and twelve
relative to grades nine and ten would be attributed to students dropping out of high schools. Table
4 suggests a difference between two groups: (1) grades eleven and twelve and (2) grades nine and
ten. While most students in grades nine and ten are not legally able to drop out of high school,
most students in grades eleven and twelve are legally able to do so. This implies that the coefficients
estimated for grades eleven and twelve reflect both the migration effect and the drop-out effect.
Since it is unlikely that students suddenly change migration pattern once they enter eleventh grade,
any additional decrease in enrollment in grades eleven and twelve relative to grade nine is most
likely coming from students dropping out of school. Collectively, this evidence suggests that the
migration effect of violence on high school enrollment is small while the drop out effect of violence
on enrollment is significant.12
Extending the analysis of Equation (3.3), Table 3.5 shows that the results are robust to the
addition of fixed effects for the interactions between four census regions and years as well as the
interactions between nine census divisions and years.13 These additional fixed effects control for
other unobserved factors that are common to a census region or census divisions each year, which
affect educational attainments and are correlated with crime rates. The estimates of interest are
smaller after including additional fixed effects for both grade eleven and twelve enrollment. How-
ever, the correlation between dropping out and crime remains. Results in Table 3.5 suggest that
the coefficients from the enrollment analysis is robust to other shocks to students, such as the emer-
gence of crack cocaine markets that spread over certain areas in some years (Evans, Garthwaite
and Moore 2012).
The evidence from Table 3.6 suggests that the interpretation of the result from this analysis is
11For grade eleven, 1.10β = 1.10−0.017 = 0.998 and for grade twelve, 1.10β = 1.10−0.037 = 0.996.
12Cullen and Levitt (1999) estimate that a 1 percent increase in crime translates into a 0.1 percent decline in
city population. This suggests that coefficients from city-level analysis mainly capture the effect of crime after the
migration effect takes place.
13There are four census regions (Northeast, Midwest, South and West) and nine census divisions (New England,
Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central,
Mountain and Pacific).
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more plausible in one direction — crime affecting educational attainment. Table 3.1 shows that the
population under eighteen is responsible for around 10 percent of violent crime arrests. Following
the calculation by Levitt (1998), the number of known offenses committed by individuals under
eighteen is calculated by using the proportion of under eighteen individuals who are responsible
for the total number of arrests. The fact that the coefficient for this variable is close to zero when
added into the fixed effects model suggests that reverse causality is less likely in this analysis.
Table 3.7 shows the association between violent crime rates and high school enrollment in
community areas of Chicago. This analysis provides additional information to the previous findings
in two meaningful ways. First, it uses crime rates from a smaller local area, which improves the
validity of the proxy for the environment in which students live. Also, four subgroups of violent
crime substitute for the aggregate violent crime rate, and the association between these four type of
violent crimes and enrollment is then estimated. Including subgroups of violent crime separately in
the analysis of Chicago community areas is worthwhile because the smaller regional area increases
the likelihood that one can uncover whether students react differently to different types of violent
crime.
F-test statistics at the bottom of Table 3.7 show that four violent crime measures have a
statistically significant negative association with enrollment in grade eleven. Other grades do not
have this statistical significance, although the coefficients are consistently in the same direction.
Adding all four coefficients from the grade 11 analysis suggests that a 10 percent increase in the
violent crime rate leads to a 0.1 percent drop in grade eleven enrollment, which is similar to
the coefficients estimated using city-level data shown in Table 3.4.14 The negative relationship is
concentrated on homicide and aggravated assault rates. A 10 percent increase in the homicide rate
is associated with a decrease in grade eleven enrollment of 0.4 percent, and a 10 percent increase in
the aggravated assault rate is associated with 1 percent drop in grade 11 enrollment.15 However,
the negative association between violent crime and grade twelve enrollment is smaller in magnitude
than are the city-level results.
Fixed effects model estimates may understate the true magnitude of the causal effect of violent
crime rates. Increases in the number of enrolled students could be from increases in population,
and bias the estimate toward zero. Alternatively, the estimates may overstate the true magnitude
of the causal effect of violent crime rates on student enrollment. An omitted variable such as the
14For grade 11, 1.10Σβ = 1.10−0.015 = 0.999
15The association between homicide and grade eleven enrollment is 1.10β = 1.10−0.047 = 0.996 and the association
between aggravated assault and grade eleven enrollment is 1.10β = 1.10−0.107 = 0.990.
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hollowing effect of the urban area could positively influence crime rates and negatively influence
student enrollment. If many former city residents relocate to the suburbs but continue to work in
the city and be victimized there (Cullen and Levitt 1996), this could induce a spurious negative
correlation between number of enrolled students and city crime rates as measured in this paper.
3.2.3 The Negative Association between Violent Crime and NAEP Test Scores
Having established the relationship between violent crime and high school enrollment, I now es-
timate the relationship between violent crime and test scores using the National Assessment of
Educational Progress (NAEP). Table 3.8 captures the association between crime rates and NAEP
test results, showing a negative correlation in reading scores for grade four.16 The results for grade
four show that a 10 percent increase in the violent crime rate is associated with a decrease in the
state’s average reading score by 0.004 student-level standard deviations or 0.15 points.17 This is
consistent with previous research into the long-term effects of exposure to violent environments on
verbal and language skill development (Sampson et al. 2008).
Despite the negative association between violent crime and educational attainment, the rela-
tionship between violent crime and NAEP test score is weak. There may be two explanations for
this pattern of results. The effect of violent crime may be smaller for students in elementary or
middle school. The violent crime rate may also have smaller effect on educational achievement cap-
tured by the NAEP test score. Furthermore, Ananat et al. (2011) find that a one percent decrease
of the working-age population decreases the grade four reading score by 0.013, although it is not
precisely measured. Taking Ananat et al.’s estimates at face value, it suggests that the effects of
violent crime on NAEP test scores for grades four and eight are small relative to the statewide job
loss effect.
Table 3.8 shows the results from the NAEP Trial Urban Districts Assessments (TUDA), with co-
efficients about 10 times larger than state-level results.18 TUDAs from twenty large urban districts
supplement the state-level NAEP test score results.19 A 10 percent increase in the urban district
violent crime rate is associated with a decrease in the urban district’s average reading score by 0.03
16Fixed effects models are used with state and year fixed effects.
17β * log(1.10) = -0.042 * 0.095 = -0.004
18The NAEP trial urban district student-level standard deviations are not available; thus, national student-level
standard deviations are used for the standardization of test scores.
19Table 3.3 shows summary statistics of test results for TUDA. TUDA is designed to report on the performance of
public school students at the district level. NAEP has administered the mathematics, reading, science and writing
assessments to samples of students in selected urban district public schools. There are 18 urban districts with multiple
years of observations, ranging from two to five observations for each district.
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student-level standard deviations, or slightly above 1 point.20 This suggests that the association
between crime and educational outcomes is amplified in cities.
3.3 Instrumental Variable Model using Individual-Level Data
I use another approach, instrumental variable model, to answer the identical research question,
which is the effect of violent crime on educational attainment. The benefit of using two different
models for the same research question is to have two chances of obtaining unbiased estimates under
different assumptions. An instrumental variable estimator will require a different set of assump-
tions compared to fixed effect estimators. When these two different approaches provide similar
conclusions, we can be more confident in the relationship between violent crime and educational
attainment.
This section approaches the research question by using the implementation of the Electronic
Benefit Transfer (EBT) program as an instrumental variable. Implementation of the EBT program
changes the delivery method from paper checks to debit cards for welfare benefit payments such as
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) in all states.21 The Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, which is known as the Welfare Reform Act, of 1996
required every state to implement the EBT program by 2004.22 Three objectives of the reform
were to achieve efficiency in payment delivery, to reduce fraud losses and to increase recipient
advantages (Pulliam 1997). Tables 3.9 and 3.10 list the specific years of implementation and the
participating programs.
Using state-wide implementation of the EBT program as an instrumental variable, the second
stage equation is:
Yist = Crimestβ +Xstγ + µi + ζt + ist (3.4)
and the first stage equation is:
Crimest = EBTst−1δ +Xstυ + µi + ζt + νist (3.5)
where Yist is the educational attainment of individual i who lives in state s at year t. EBTst−1 is the
20β * log(1.10) = -0.316 * 0.095 = -0.03
21Most states also use the EBT program for delivery of payments from Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) programs. Some states use the EBT program for delivery of other payments as well. Full information is
available in Tables 3.9 and 3.10.
22Five states (Maryland, New Mexico, South Carolina, Texas and Utah) completed implementation before this
legislation but most implemented it as a result of the reform.
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state-wide EBT implementation indicator, which takes a value of 1 for years after implementation
and 0 otherwise for state s in year t. Crimest is the log violent crime rate calculated using the
total number of violent offenses known per 100,000 people. Control variables include log personal
income per capita and the unemployment rate for state s in year t. The individual fixed effects,
µi, control for the time-invariant characteristics of a student, such as race, parent education and
family background, that could affect educational outcomes and might be correlated with local crime
rates. Also, ζt are year fixed effects that control for macro-level common shocks all students face
in a particular year. Standard errors are clustered at the state level to account for the possible
correlation of errors among individuals living in the same state as well as among different time
periods for a given individual.
For the EBT program to be a valid instrument, implementation of it should have an effect on
crime rates, Cov(Crimest, EBTst−1|Xst) 6= 0. Evidence for the effect of the EBT program on crime
rates is identified in an NBER working paper, “Less Cash, Less Crime: Evidence from the Electronic
Benefit Transfer Program” by Wright, Tekin, Topalli, McClellan, Dickinson and Rosenfeld (2014).
They find that overall crime decreased by 9.8 percent in response to implementation of the EBT
program, with a significant drop in assault, burglary and larceny. They exploit the fact that the
program was rolled-out at various times to estimate the effect of EBT program implementation on
crime rates. As a primary mechanism, they argue that a significant decrease in circulating cash in
poor neighborhoods reduces crime motivated by the acquisition of cash.
To satisfy the exclusion restriction, crime should be the only reason for the relationship between
educational attainment and EBT implementation, Cov(EBTst−1, ist|Xst) = 0. Specifically, the
exclusion restriction has two parts: the EBT program should be as good as randomly assigned and
should not influence educational outcomes through a channel other than a reduction in the crime
rate. With these conditions satisfied, EBT program implementation will be a valid instrumental
variable that will help identify the effect of violent crime on educational attainment.
It is possible the exclusion restriction might not be met, which would threaten the validity of
the instrumental variable analysis. Because states were given until 2004 to implement the EBT
program, each state’s decision to implement the program in a particular year could have been
endogenously determined. In particular, if the states that implemented the program early differ
substantially on observable characteristics relative to those that implemented the program later, it
is highly likely that the EBT implementation was not as good as randomly assigned. Furthermore,
there are possible pathways through which the EBT program can affect students from families
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receiving welfare payments. However, more careful sample selection and further evidence suggest
that it is unlikely the implementation will not satisfy the exclusion restriction.
Similar characteristics between groups of states with different years of implementation suggest
that the implementation timing is not endogenous. To investigate whether the EBT implementation
is as good as randomly assigned, I compared early-adopter states to others that implemented the
program later. Nine states implemented the program early, in 1997, and five states implemented
the program later, in 2003 or 2004.23 Table 3.11 compares summary statistics of many variables
a year before implementation and shows similarity among the early and later adopting states.
Moreover, Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show personal income per capita and percent of population below
the poverty line for the early versus later implementing states. These figures indicate that per
capita personal income and percent of population below the poverty line patterns before and after
the implementation are similar in the two groups of states.
To satisfy the exclusion restriction in the instrumental variable analysis, it is important to
understand whether program implementation affects other aspects of society that can, in turn,
influence educational outcomes. If EBT implementation did change these other aspects, than
implementation would not be a valid instrument. There are four separate possible paths that can
make the instrument invalid.
First, the EBT program could generate a shock to the macroeconomic system that affects the
local economy, which, in turn, can change educational expenditures. I run a separate regression to
identify the possible effect of the EBT program on the state-level economy. The results indicate
that the program does not affect state-level aggregate measures, such as GDP per capita, total
employment or the percentage of the population under the poverty line. This evidence suggests
that it is unlikely that EBT implementation affected the state economy in a significant way.24
If implementation changes the actions of welfare recipients, those changes may be correlated
with unobserved child or family characteristics that independently affect educational attainment.
As a second pathway, the reduction in crime related to welfare payments may increase the disposable
income of welfare recipient families by reducing payment theft and leaving households with a larger
share of welfare payments. If such increases in disposable income improve educational outcomes,
then the IV estimates of β will be biased and overstate the negative effects of violent crime. This
23The nine states that implemented the EBT program in 1997 are Alabama, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, North Dakota, Pennsylvania and South Dakota. Five states that implemented the EBT
program in 2003 or 2004 are California, Delaware, Iowa, Maine and West Virginia.
24Results can be provided upon request to the author.
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would be under the assumption that investment in education is a “normal good” such that higher
disposable income leads to higher educational investment. Therefore, for the instrumental variable
analysis to be valid, I should eliminate the income effect on educational attainment among the
students.
Third, if EBT implementation makes it harder for recipients of government welfare payments
to consume illegal drugs, there will be a reduction in use of illegal drugs, as well as hospitalization
and death. This positive change can improve educational attainment for students in the recipient
households, as it means less distraction from academics. Dobkin and Puller (2007) document that
some welfare recipients use monthly payments to consume illegal drugs, and increased drug use leads
to more frequent hospitalization and death close to monthly delivery dates of welfare payments.
This suggests that consumption limitation due to the EBT program can affect household behavior
receiving welfare payments.
Fourth, it is also possible that implementation reduces the demand for criminal income. Prior
to Wright et al. (2014), papers studying the effect of the program on crime focused on the demand
for cash. Foley (2011) finds that there exists temporal crime patterns between monthly payments,
with higher crime rates further away from monthly payment dates. EBT implementation weakens
this mechanism as it is harder to obtain cash from EBT debit cards than the previously distributed
checks. If so, limiting consumption to legitimate goods will slow the use of welfare payments and
reduce the financial motive to commit a crime further into the payment cycle. This change in the
household behavior can affect student educational attainment by lessening the financial constraint
later in the payment cycle.
To restrict the implementation effect on student educational attainment through a reduction in
the crime rate channel, I restricted the analysis to a sample of students from families ineligible for
welfare. Students in families ineligible for welfare benefits are unlikely to have incomes or behaviors
affected by EBT implementation since their gross income is not dependent on the welfare payment
system. This independence eliminates the effect of a possible EBT-driven change in household
behavior on student educational outcomes. Specifically, students from a family with a family gross
income of more than 130 percent of the poverty line are included in the analysis, which makes
them ineligible for Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits.25 Analyzing
students from families ineligible for welfare limits the income and behavior change pathways, thus,
25Eligibility for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), documented by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, is defined as gross income of a household not exceeding 130 percent of the
poverty line. http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligibility
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strengthening the evidence that the exclusion restriction is valid.
For the purpose of data analysis, a separate individual fixed effect is included when an individual
moves to a different state. This restricts the analysis to observations where the respondents have
spent two years in the same state.26 To check for robustness of the results relative to the treatment
of movers in the sample, two different approaches are made: using only non-mover individuals, or
using only observations that are from the state first survey that was conducted.
3.3.1 NLSY97 Individual-Level Data
I construct individual-level data by merging the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY97) data with violent crime rates from the UCR. NLSY97 is a nationally representative
sample of 8,984 individuals who were twelve to sixteen years old as of the end of 1996. The
NLSY97 collects extensive information about their educational experiences over time. Educational
data include details about schooling history such as the timing and types of degrees received. Other
areas covered in the questionnaire are family background, criminal behavior, and alcohol and drug
use.27
In addition to a rich set of student-level variables, NLSY97 has information on residence location
which allows this study to identify the effect of violent crime rates on educational outcomes. This
crucial part of the data is from the confidential NLSY97 Geocode files, which are merged with the
NLSY97 public-use files to identify respondent residential areas for each survey year, especially
during high school. Furthermore, NLSY97 follows individuals even after moving, which reduces the
problem related to sample attrition.
Table 3.12 presents the proportion of student dropouts and other characteristics in the NLSY97
data. High school dropouts total 17.9 percent of students in the sample, and slightly over half,
51.2 percent, of the sample attended some college. When comparing educational outcomes between
areas with high and low violent crime rates, higher educational outcomes are found in areas with
a violent crime rates below the median. For instance, in high crime rate areas, 22.1 percent of
students dropped out, while in low crime rate areas, 13 percent dropped out.
The concentration of negative characteristics in high crime rate areas is not shown consistently
when other student characteristics are analyzed (see the lower half of Table 3.12). Although the
mother’s education level and student’s achievement in eighth grade is higher in areas with low crime
26This treatment of movers is consistent with Dustmann and Fasani (2013).
27More details can be found at the following URL: http://www.bls.gov/nls/y97summary.htm
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rates, the proportions of students who use tobacco or alcohol and who committed a crime are high
in those areas. This indicates that there is some degree of neighborhood sorting by crime rates.
However, it is not so extensive that it restricts the analysis to the information of students living in
high crime rate areas.
3.3.2 The Impact of Violent Crime on Educational Attainment
First stage results show that EBT implementation has a strong association with violent crime rates.
Table 3.13 reveals that the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F -statistic is 28.33. Based on this F -statistic,
one can reject the null hypothesis that the equation is weakly identified using the critical values
complied by Stock and Yogo (2005) or by the popular rule-of-thumb that the F -statistic exceeds 10
(Staiger and Stock 1997). The use of the rk Wald statistic is preferred in the presence of clustering,
which is the case in this study (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman 2007). Table 3.13 also shows that the
Anderson-Rubin Wald test statistic is 13.51, which implies that one can reject the null hypothesis
that the coefficient of the excluded instrument is zero. This indicates that the endogenous regressor
is relevant. These results provide evidence of a strong association between EBT implementation
and violent crime rates.28
Table 3.13 shows that EBT implementation lowers the violent crime rate by 4.6 percent across all
models.29 This effect is consistent with Wright et al. (2014), confirming that EBT implementation
decreases crime. The period during which most states implemented the EBT program overlaps well
with the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97) sample period, which began in
1997 and is conducted annually. This helps uncover strong first stage results and is also consistent
with the estimates found in the reduced form analysis in Table 3.14, where the estimates are
proportional to the causal effect of interest here.
The 2SLS estimates show that violent crime increases the likelihood of dropping out of high
school. Positive and statistically significant coefficients in the IV model with student fixed effects
show that the causal link runs from violent crime rate to educational outcomes, and they are not
merely from unobserved heterogeneity (first two columns of Table 3.15). In particular, the estimates
28Endogeneity test statistics for the model are 10.11 with the decision to dropout and 6.01 with the decision to
enroll in college. These test statistics have p-values of 0.002 and 0.014, respectively, indicating that one can reject
the null hypothesis that the specified endogenous regressor can be treated as exogenous. However, a model based on
enrollment in an associate’s program has an endogeneity test statistic of 0.254 with a p-value of 0.614. This evidence
is consistent with OLS and 2SLS estimates being close to each other for the decision to enroll in an associate’s
program. OLS estimates in the model analyzing the probability of enrollment in an associates program is the least
biased among the four estimates.
29exp(β) = exp(0.045) = 1.046
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show that a 10 percent increase in state-level violent crime rates increases the probability of dropping
out by 1.3 percentage points.30 The proportion of high school dropouts in the NLSY97 sample is
17.9 percent, and the effect identified in this analysis will, on average, increase the dropout rate
by 7.3 percent following a 10 percent increase in the violent crime rate. A one standard deviation
increase in a state violent crime rate increases the probability of dropping out by 5.4 percentage
points.31
Compared to the decision to drop out of high school, the negative effect of violent crime on
college enrollment is greater. Columns three, four and five of Table 3.15 show 2SLS estimates of the
effect on the probability of enrolling in a post-secondary institution (Equation (3.4)). The estimates
in column three show that a 10 percent increase in violent crime rate decreases the probability of
enrollment in any post-secondary institution by 4.2 percentage points.32 Although it is hard to
compare the estimates directly, Grogger (1997) finds a larger effect of violence on educational
attainment such that moderate levels of violence decrease the probability of high school graduation
by 5.1 percentage points and lower the probability of attending college by 6.9 percentage points.33
Evidence from Grogger (1997) suggests the effect of violent crime estimated in this study is in the
range of a reasonable effect size.
The negative effect on college enrollment is mainly driven by a reduction in the enrollment
in bachelor’s programs. Column five shows that the probability of enrollment in a bachelor’s
program decreases 3.4 percentage points with a 10 percent increase in violent crime rates.34 On
the contrary, a much smaller effect is identified for the probability of enrollment in an associate’s
program (column four). There are two possible explanations for the difference in estimates found
for the associate’s and bachelor’s enrollment results. First, the difference may be from students
who are not enrolling to bachelor’s degree programs and discontinuing their education after high
school graduation. Second, students may be moving from enrollment in a bachelor’s program to
an associate’s program while other students may be moving from associate’s program enrollment
to no post-secondary education which, in turn, does not change the overall likelihood of enrollment
in an associate’s program. Substitution between bachelor’s and associate’s program enrollment
30β * ln(1.1) = 0.141 * 0.0953 = 0.013
31Standard deviation of log state violent crime rate is 0.383 during the sample period. β * 1SD = 0.141 * 0.383 =
0.054
32β * ln(1.1) = -0.441 * 0.0953 = -0.042
33The level of violence is measured by an index constructed from principal reports and is grouped into four levels,
with the proportion of schools in each category in parentheses: minimal (27.3), minor (62.8), moderate (8.8) and
serious (1.1).
34β * ln(1.1) = -0.353 * 0.0953 = -0.034
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may generate the difference in estimates found in columns four and five. A one standard deviation
increase in the state violent crime rate decreases the likelihood of enrolling in a post-secondary
institution by 16.9 percentage points and lowers bachelor’s program enrollment by 13.5 percentage
points.35
It is worth mentioning that all estimates are from an analysis with student fixed effects. A fixed
effects model using individual-level data from NLSY97 can control for time-invariant student char-
acteristics and family attributes. Characteristics such as student ability, race and sex are controlled
using student fixed effects. Furthermore, student fixed effects control for parental education, as
well as family culture, which is considered an important determinant in the educational production
function. Since obtaining coefficients for control variables is not the main interest of this paper,
and there are only a limited number of student and family characteristic variables, student fixed
effects are included instead of limited control variables.
The estimated effects of violent crime can be compared to those of traditional educational inputs,
such as school quality and expenditure. This comparison allows one to quantify the estimated
increase in educational expenditure that is necessary to offset the negative effect generated by an
increase in violent crime. The estimated effect of a 10 percent increase in violent crime is around
two fifths of the effect size of an additional $100 of Title I-induced current expenditure per pupil
(Cascio, Gordon and Reber 2013). They find that each additional $100 of Title I-induced current
expenditure per pupil received in 1969 was associated with a decrease in high school dropout rates
of about 3.5 percentage points for whites, the group of students most likely to benefit from an
increased budget in the district.36
The impact of violent crime on educational outcomes is also comparable to other factors such
as bullying experience and closure of public housing. For instance, Brown and Taylor (2008) find
that an one standard deviation increase in the bullying experience index at age eleven increases the
probability of having “no education” by approximately 1.6 percent.37 A one standard deviation
increase in the bullying index has an effect on educational attainment similar to a 10 percent increase
in the violent crime rate. Jacob (2004) finds that a high-rise public housing closure increases the
likelihood of dropping out of high school by 4.4 percentage points for students fourteen years or
older at the time of the closure announcement. Moves induced by public housing closure have more
35For all post-secondary institution enrollment: β * 1SD = -0.441 * 0.383 = -0.169. For bachelor’s program
enrollment: β * 1SD = -0.353 * 0.383 = -0.135.
36In 1960, 32 percent of whites were high school dropouts. The dollar value is in real 2009 U.S. dollars.
37“No education” level is the lowest educational attainment in the UK.
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than a threefold effect on the likelihood of dropping out of high school relative to a 10 percent
increase in the violent crime rate.
In contrast to the 2SLS estimates, the OLS estimates of Equation (3.4) shown in Table 3.16
suggest that violent crime has no association with three outcomes: dropping out of high school,
college enrollment and bachelor’s program enrollment. There may be two sources driving the
differences between 2SLS and OLS estimates: the bias of OLS estimates and the difference between
the subpopulations the instrumental variable is based on. First, in Table 3.15 2SLS estimates
capture the causal effect of violent crime on the educational outcomes, while fixed effects model
estimates are mixed with omitted variable bias and selection bias. Since crime and other negative
local area factors are highly correlated, estimates from the fixed effects model may be larger than
the 2SLS estimates. However, the OLS estimate is smaller than 2SLS estimates for the least
biased outcome, the decision to enroll in an associate’s program. This pattern is also found when
comparing city fixed effects model estimates to instrumental variable estimates. Although bias that
overstates the effect of violent crime may seem more likely, it is shown that estimates from the city
fixed effect model are smaller in magnitude than those from the instrumental variable model. This
hints that the next reason may be the dominant explanation for the difference between OLS and
2SLS estimates.
The instrumental variable estimator recovers local average treatment effects (LATE) rather
than average treatment effects (ATE) (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin 1996; Imbens and Angrist 1994;
Heckman 1997). The instrumental variable estimator is capturing the LATE from a subpopula-
tion that experienced an actual change in the violent crime rate due to EBT implementation. This
suggests that the instrumental variable estimator is capturing effects on students living in neighbor-
hoods with a large proportion of welfare recipients. Because neighborhoods with high proportions
of welfare recipients are likely to have lower school quality and negative neighborhood attributes,
the LATE of the effect of violent crime on educational attainment should be larger than the ATE
of such effect. Also, educational attainment as an outcome may be more suitable to capture the
effects for students in the lower end of the distribution. This aspect of educational attainment
could amplify the difference between LATE and ATE, which will show up as the difference between
OLS and the 2SLS estimates.
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3.3.3 The Impact of Violent Crime by Student Characteristic
In this section, I identify the role that different student characteristics play in the relationship
between violent crimes and educational outcomes. It may be possible that violent crime may affect
students with certain traits more severely than others. Identifying these groups of students will
provide further details for the policymakers when they think of future interventions. Table 3.17
provides evidence as to whether the effect varies with predetermined cognitive skills and behavioral
outcomes, as well as demographic information and family attributes. Specifically, heterogeneity of
the main effect is analyzed by self-reported criminal behavior, and tobacco or alcohol usage during
high school.
The second and third rows of Table 3.17 show that the effect of violent crime on the probability of
dropping out of high school is identified for male students only and is negligible for female students.
Papers studying the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment find a large gender difference in the
effects on behavioral and health outcomes (Ludwig et al. 2001; Katz et al. 2001). The interacted
estimates identify that a 10 percent increase in violent crime rates increases the probability of
dropping out by 2.4 percentage points for male students but the impact is minimal for female
students.38 This pattern continues with bachelor’s program enrollment decisions; however, the
effect of violent crime on the probability of college enrollment is large for both male and female
students.
The next two rows in Table 3.17 show that students from all races are similarly affected by violent
crimes when it comes to dropping out of high school. However, African American and Hispanic
students are more heavily affected by the impact of violent crime in terms of the likelihood of
enrolling in a post-secondary institution. The same group of students show a significantly lower
probability of enrolling in associate’s and bachelor’s program in response to higher violent crime
rates. Furthermore, violent crime’s effect on the decision to drop out of high school and enroll
in college varies among student subgroups. This highlights the fact that the two educational
attainment decisions are different.
The effect of violent crime on both educational attainment decisions is sizable regardless of the
family background. However, the type of post-secondary institution driving the result varies by
family characteristics. As extant studies find that family background affects educational outcomes,
I use mother’s education as a measure for family characteristic to investigate the interaction of
38β * ln(1.1) = 0.257 * 0.0953 = 0.024
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family characteristic. Rows six and seven of Table 3.17 show that violent crime similarly affect the
probability of dropping out of high school or enrolling in a college. The violent crime decreases the
likelihood of enrollment in a bachelor’s program for those students whose mothers have some college
experience or more education, and lowers the probability of enrollment in an associate’s programs
for students whose mothers have at most a high school degree. This highlights the heterogeneity
of the effect of violent crime on educational attainment with respect to family background.
The effects of violent crime on educational attainment are concentrated among students with a
below-median grade point average in eighth grade. These students are far more likely to drop out
of high school and less likely to enroll in any post-secondary institutions due to violent crime. This
pattern can be explained in two ways: by heterogeneity of the effect or by construction of outcome
variables. First, violent crime may only affect students in the low end of the distribution and it
may be the reason this pattern is shown in rows eight and nine of Table 3.17. Another explanation
builds on the fact that educational attainment is fundamentally more relevant to students at the
low end of the distribution. This may reflect that many low-performing students are on the margin
between continuing education and stopping at secondary or post-secondary levels. Students at the
high end of the distribution may be equally affected by violent crimes; however, this educational
attainment measure may not capture the effect violent crimes have on those students.
The last four rows of Table 3.17 show estimates of the interaction effect of the violent crime rate
and student behavioral issues on educational attainment. Among the groups of student character-
istics, the largest difference in coefficients is generated by the interaction with the use of tobacco
or alcohol during high school, highlighting that behavioral problems could aggravate the influence
of violent crime on drop outs and college enrollment. For students who use tobacco or alcohol, a
10 percent increase in the violent crime rate decreases the likelihood of enrolling in college by 6.0
percentage points.39 The last two rows of Table 3.17 show that self-reported criminal involvement
does not generate a significant difference in the dropout estimates. The violent crime rate shows a
similar negative effect on the probability of both those who committed a crime in high school and
those who did not; of dropping out and of enrolling in college. However, the college enrollment
impact for students not involved in crime is concentrated in bachelor’s programs while for those
involved in crime is concentrated in associate’s programs.
39β * ln(1.1) = -0.625 * 0.0953 = 0.060
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3.3.4 Robustness
Table 3.18 finds that different sample periods generate a range of estimates, but they are consistently
close to the results found in Table 3.15. The main analysis in Table 3.15 uses a sample that includes
years prior to 2009 because the youngest cohort in the NLSY97 turned twenty-four that year. This
is to be consistent with the definition for high school status completion rate by the National Center
for Educational Statistics (NCES).40 Estimates in column three resemble the main results, and
other columns show estimates for different sample periods. As the time frame lengthens for both
panels, the sizes of the estimates decrease because fewer students are making the decision regarding
educational attainment as they get older.
Column two of Table 3.19 shows similar estimates without using data from states that imple-
mented the EBT program before welfare reform. Tables 3.9 and 3.10 show that five states that
implemented the EBT program before the federal government passed the welfare reform.41 Since
these states endogenously chose to implement the EBT program, if there exists any possible asso-
ciation between EBT program implementation and educational policies, it will be most severe in
these five states. Thus, excluding these states from the analysis will provide estimates only using
states that were forced by the federal government to implement the EBT program. These estimates
are in similar magnitude to the main estimates, as shown in Panel A and B. This indicates that
endogeneity of the timing of EBT implementation is not a severe problem in the identification.
Table 3.19 column three shows that estimates are similar after further restricting the sample to
those families with gross income over 200 percent of the poverty line. Families with gross income
of more than 130 percent of the poverty line are possibly eligible for welfare benefits. Increasing
the cutoff to 200 percent of the poverty line would eliminate the possibility that a family could
be eligible for any welfare payments. Finding similar estimates demonstrates the robustness of
estimates in terms of the sample restriction on family gross income relative to the poverty line.
Column four of Table 3.19 shows that the estimates using the entire NLSY97 sample without
family income restriction are similar to the main estimates shown in column one. Instead of only
using students from welfare-ineligible families, column four uses all student in the NLSY97 data.
Some students in this sample might receive greater disposable income after EBT implementation
due to less crime targeting their welfare payments. Students could also live in families that change
40High school status completion rate is defined as the percentage of individuals between eighteen and twenty-four
with high school credentials (Heckman and LaFontaine, 2010).
41Maryland, New Mexico, South Carolina, Texas and Utah.
49
their behavior due to the EBT program. However, estimates from a more general sample will
provide additional information. Furthermore, not using the family income restriction will include
students from most disadvantageous environment which would increase the policy relevance of the
results. The estimates found in this analysis are similar in magnitude, but smaller in size relative
to the main estimate. They show that a 10 percent increase in the violent crime rates increases
the probability of dropping out by 1.2 percentage points.42 Although this estimate and the main
estimate are not statistically different, this may suggest a small positive effect of EBT program on
educational attainment through income effect or improved household behaviors.
Different sample treatment of movers generate similar estimates, which suggests that the results
are robust with regard to mover treatment. The main analysis treats a student who moved to a
different state as a separate individual and includes them as two different individuals. Table 3.20
shows similar estimates from two different treatments of movers in the sample. Panel A only uses
students who did not move to a different state during the entire survey period. Panel B uses
information from the state where students started their surveys. One of three treatments of movers
in the sample is necessary to allow correlation among errors from those students living in the same
state and facing the same state-level crime rate.43 Similarity in estimates provides confidence that
the particular treatment of the mover is not driving the results.
3.4 Conclusions
Since educational attainment is one of the most fundamental aspects of human capital, identifying
violent crime as a determinant of educational attainment is important. Evidence of an increase in
return to schooling emphasizes the importance of the negative impact of violent crime on educational
attainment. Furthermore, the implication of educational attainment for individuals has grown as
the return to education increased in recent decades, by 20 to 50 percent between the 1980s and
2000s (Goldin and Katz 2007). This increase in return to education may be from two separate
sources: return to schooling and return to ability. Cawley et al. (1998) find that, in the 1980s,
an increase in return to ability was responsible for an increase in return to education. However,
Castex and Kogan Dechter (2014) show that return to cognitive ability has declined substantially
42β * ln(1.1) = 0.125 * 0.0953 = 0.012
43These sample restrictions do not significantly alter the coefficients compared to those coefficients from analysis
using the entire sample without clustered standard errors. However, when this correlation is neglected and each
student is treated as having independent information, the standard errors are at least seven times smaller than the
ones from the analysis using clustered errors as shown.
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while the return to schooling has increased between the 1980s and 2000s.
The return to education literature highlights that high school graduates have significantly higher
average labor market earnings compared with high school dropouts (Cameron and Heckman 1993).
This implies that the additional high school dropouts induced by higher crime rates will, on average,
experience a decrease in their labor market prospects. Even if those students decide to obtain a
GED later in life, the average labor market outcomes for GED recipients is much closer to that
of dropouts without this credential than to conventional high school graduates (Murnane, Willett
and Tyler 2000; Cameron and Heckman 1993). Since high school dropouts and GED recipients
earn similar hourly wages, helping students reach higher educational attainments and obtain a high
school diploma would be beneficial for them.
Students not enrolling in college due to negative effects of violent crime may be losing a mean-
ingful proportion of their expected lifetime income. Students whose educational attainment are
affected by violent crime are likely to be academically marginal students. For a marginal student,
return to education may be smaller than the return for an average student. However, Zimmerman
(2014) finds that even for academically marginal students, the private and social benefits of attend-
ing a university are large and exceed the cost. He finds that marginal admission yields earnings
gains of 22 percent between 8 and 14 years after high school completion.
At the societal level, lower violent crime rates may generate significant public benefits by in-
creasing the number of high school graduates. Levin et al. (2007) calculate the total monetized
lifetime benefits of each new high school graduate to be $127,000.44 This is the result of calculating
the present discounted value of each graduate’s earnings relative to a person who drops out, how
much a graduate contributes over his lifetime in terms of additional taxes, and lower health-care
and welfare costs. From a police policy perspective, the relationship between violent crime and
educational attainment can be seen as an additional negative externality of crime, which should be
considered when determining the optimal level of policing. Safety measures, which are one of the
most important aspects of a society, might be under-provided if one neglects the effect of violent
crime on educational outcomes.
The results from this study confirm the spillover effect of crime and suggest that there is a ben-
efit from an interdepartmental approach to education policies. Collaboration between government
education agencies and others related to governing crime rates could create positive synergies and
lead to policies that will increase educational outcomes for students by decreasing violent crime.
44The estimates are adjusted to 2010 dollars.
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Thus, policymakers will be encouraged to think about educational policies from a broader perspec-
tive. The Safe Schools and Healthy Students Initiative is a good example of an educational policy
that the Departments of Health and Human Services, Education, and Justice have collaborated
on to create a safe and secure environment for students. This will lead to my next project, which
is studying the effect of the Safe Schools and Healthy Students Initiative on student educational
outcomes and other behaviors.
3.5 Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: Proportion of High School Students using Substance
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics from 229 Large Cities
Variables Mean Std. Dev. N
Violent Crime Rate 1974 1239 8537
Violent Arrest Rate 1003 756 8537
Violent Arrest Rate under 18 109 93 8537
Property Crime Rate 6291 2515 8537
Property Arrest Rate 1027 587 8537
Property Arrest Rate under 18 239 188 8537
Note: Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for crime rate
and enrollment variables used in city-level enrollment analy-
sis. Large city is defined as city with population over 100,000
in 2000.
Source: UCR and CCD
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Figure 3.2: Violent Crime Rate Trend in 12 Largest Cities
Source: UCR
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics from Chicago Community Areas
High Crime Area Low Crime Area
Variables Mean Diff. P-value
Enrollment in Grade 9 581 596 -15 0.590
Enrollment in Grade 10 573 526 47 0.121
Enrollment in Grade 11 441 438 3 0.908
Enrollment in Grade 12 380 383 -3 0.909
Source: City of Chicago Data Portal
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Figure 3.3: Chicago Community Areas
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics from NAEP Test Results
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Indiv. Std. Dev. N
State Level
Grade 4 Math 232.4 10.8 29.1 390
Grade 4 Reading 217.5 8.2 36.4 430
Grade 8 Math 275.4 11.3 36.4 425
Garde 8 Reading 262.5 6.8 34.8 341
Trial Urban District Level
Grade 4 Math 227.3 10.6 29.1 76
Grade 4 Reading 205.9 10.2 36.4 83
Grade 8 Math 265.4 12.1 36.4 76
Garde 8 Reading 248.8 7.9 34.8 82
Note: Mean is computed by taking the average across states
and years of the reported state-level averages. Std. Dev.
is computed by taking the standard deviation across states
and years of the reported state-level averages. Indiv. Std.
Dev. is computed by taking an average across years of the na-
tional student-level standard deviations reported by NAEP for
a given assessment and year.
Source: National Center for Education Statistics
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Figure 3.4: Personal Income per Capita
Source: BEA
Figure 3.5: Percent of Population Below Poverty Line
Source: BEA
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Table 3.4: Fixed Effects Model Estimates of the Relationship
Between Violent Crime and Enrollment Level in High School
at the City Level
Log Enrollment in Grade
Variables 9 10 11 12
Ln(Violent) 0.021 0.001 -0.017** -0.037*
(0.0189) (0.012) (0.008) (0.019)
Unemployment Rate 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.014**
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
% aged 10-19 2.36** 2.325*** 1.051** 1.191**
(1.130) (0.656) (0.464) (0.575)
% aged 20-29 0.065 0.649 -0.116 -0.340
(0.917) (0.485) (0.488) (0.655)
% aged 30-39 0.488 0.524 -0.521 -0.560
(1.003) (0.550) (0.635) (0.812)
% aged 40-49 0.825 0.717 0.231 0.243
(0.763) (0.492) (0.463) (0.634)
% aged over 50 -0.198 0.446 -0.211 -0.177
(0.701) (0.409) (0.369) (0.503)
% Male 0.682 0.363 0.345 0.0380
(0.657) (0.407) (0.386) (0.502)
% Black -0.219 0.284 0.162 0.0438
(0.478) (0.354) (0.355) (0.414)
% Minority -0.616 -0.596* -0.622** -1.429**
(0.449) (0.312) (0.304) (0.592)
Constant -16.39*** -23.70*** -20.74*** -30.26***
(4.902) (4.278) (3.940) (4.558)
Observations 4,651 4,655 4,659 4,660
Number of Cities 229 228 227 227
R-squared 0.458 0.542 0.658 0.610
Note: Table 3.4 presents fixed effects model estimates for number of
student in grade 9 to 12. Ln(Violent) is the log of the number of vi-
olent crime per 100,000 population. Unemployment rate represents
the state unemployment rate. Minority is defined as people who are
non-whites and non-blacks. Coefficient for city, year fixed effects,
and city-specific trends are not shown. The sample covers the pe-
riod 1986-2011. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: CCD, BEA and UCR
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Table 3.5: Fixed Effects Model Estimates of the Relationship Between Violent
Crime and Enrollment Level in High School at the City Level with Additional
Fixed Effects
Log Enrollment in Grade 11 Log Enrollment in Grade 12
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(Violent) -0.017** -0.013* -0.012 -0.037* -0.032** -0.031**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014)
Unemployment 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.014** 0.016** 0.015
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
% aged 10-19 1.051** 1.177** 0.025 1.191** 1.146** 0.517
(0.464) (0.466) (0.731) (0.575) (0.526) (0.847)
% aged 20-29 -0.116 0.054 -1.100 -0.340 -0.218 -1.074
(0.488) (0.597) (0.964) (0.655) (0.719) (1.170)
% aged 30-39 -0.521 -0.277 -1.104 -0.560 -0.514 -1.290
(0.635) (0.756) (1.025) (0.812) (0.944) (1.294)
% aged 40-49 0.231 0.337 -0.732 0.243 0.154 -0.732
(0.463) (0.559) (0.783) (0.634) (0.753) (1.067)
% aged over 50 -0.211 -0.001 -0.645 -0.177 -0.159 -0.484
(0.369) (0.439) (0.597) (0.503) (0.582) (0.789)
% Male 0.345 0.240 0.518 0.038 -0.227 -0.012
(0.386) (0.386) (0.442) (0.502) (0.581) (0.498)
% Black 0.162 0.233 0.300 0.044 0.326 0.345
(0.355) (0.348) (0.409) (0.414) (0.429) (0.445)
% Minority -0.622** -0.789** -0.896** -1.429** -1.605** -1.625***
(0.304) (0.299) (0.383) (0.592) (0.646) (0.523)
Constant -20.74*** -22.42*** -22.91*** -30.26*** -31.92*** -28.68***
(3.940) (4.058) (4.775) (4.558) (5.024) (6.327)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
City FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
City Trend Y Y Y Y Y Y
Region*Year FE Y Y
Division*Year FE Y Y
Note: Table 3.5 presents fixed effects model estimates for number of student in grade 11
and 12. Ln(Violent) is the log of the number of violent crime per 100,000 population.
Unemployment represents the unemployment rate. Minority is defined as people who
are non-whites and non-blacks. Four Census Regions are Northeast, Midwest, South and
West. Nine Census Divisions are New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central,
West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Moun-
tain and Pacific. There are 4,659 observations covering the period 1986-2011. Standard
errors are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: CCD, BEA and UCR
57
Table 3.6: Fixed Effects Model Estimates of the Relationship Be-
tween Violent Crime and Enrollment Level in High School at the
City Level with Additional Controls
Log Enrollment in Grade
Variables 9 10 11 12
Ln(Violent) 0.040 0.006 -0.026 -0.035
(0.043) (0.028) (0.021) (0.027)
Ln(Arst in Viol) 0.00556 -0.000928 0.0121 0.0148
(0.0198) (0.0165) (0.0141) (0.0138)
Ln(Arst in Viol under 18) -0.00189 0.00125 0.000512 -0.00247
(0.00785) (0.00895) (0.00858) (0.00686)
Unemployment Rate 0.00451 0.00397 0.00265 0.00945*
(0.00756) (0.00437) (0.00436) (0.00493)
% aged 10-19 2.869** 2.710*** 1.220** 1.172*
(1.325) (0.811) (0.537) (0.634)
% aged 20-29 0.452 1.058** 0.0751 -0.215
(0.978) (0.497) (0.375) (0.510)
% aged 30-39 0.973 0.723 -0.383 -0.388
(1.176) (0.635) (0.508) (0.524)
% aged 40-49 1.384 0.926* 0.198 0.140
(0.853) (0.541) (0.418) (0.519)
% aged over 50 0.294 0.893* -0.00785 -0.0225
(0.776) (0.467) (0.356) (0.421)
% Male 0.928 0.539 0.467 0.250
(0.679) (0.387) (0.386) (0.537)
% Black -0.155 0.394 0.158 0.0537
(0.482) (0.321) (0.365) (0.412)
% Minority -0.539 -0.544 -0.586* -1.175
(0.480) (0.336) (0.326) (0.720)
Constant -18.94*** -26.39*** -24.84*** -34.22***
(6.007) (4.853) (4.341) (5.251)
Observations 4,236 4,240 4,244 4,245
Number of Cities 228 227 226 226
R-squared 0.466 0.562 0.715 0.711
Note: Table 3.6 presents fixed effects model estimates for number of stu-
dent in grade 9 to 12. Ln(Violent) is the log of the number of violent crime
per 100,000 population. Ln(Arst in Viol) is the log of the number of arrests
in violent crime per 100,000 population. Ln(Arst in Viol under 18) is the
log of the number of arrests in violent crime committed by people under
18 per 100,000 population. Unemployment rate represents the state-level
unemployment rate. Minority is defined as people who are non-whites and
non-blacks. Coefficient for city, year fixed effects and city-specific trends
are not shown. The sample covers the period 1986-2011. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: CCD, CPS, BEA and UCR
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Table 3.7: Fixed Effects Model Estimates of the Relation-
ship Between Violent Crime and Enrollment Level in High
School at the Community Area Level in Chicago
Log Enrollment in Grade
Variables 9 10 11 12
Ln(Homicide) -0.027 -0.038 -0.047* -0.024
(0.031) (0.025) (0.027) (0.029)
Ln(Robbery) 0.148 0.114 0.124 0.106
(0.102) (0.087) (0.082) (0.071)
Ln(Aggravated Assault) -0.067 -0.039 -0.107** -0.032
(0.077) (0.060) (0.049) (0.059)
Ln(Aggravated Battery) -0.183 -0.148 0.015 -0.059
(0.113) (0.097) (0.086) (0.098)
F test statistic = F(4,56) 1.30 1.64 2.58 1.08
P-value 0.283 0.177 0.047 0.375
Observations 500 496 493 489
Number of Comm. Areas 57 57 57 57
R-squared 0.001 0.007 0.015 0.024
Note: Table 3.7 presents fixed effects model estimates for the ef-
fect of various crime on high school enrollment level. All crime
variables are the log of the number of crime per 100,000 popula-
tion. Coefficients for other control variables, community area and
year fixed effects are not shown. The sample covers the period
2003 to 2013. Standard errors are clustered at the community
area level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: City of Chicago Data Portal
59
Table 3.8: Fixed Effects Model Estimates of the Relation-
ship Between Violent Crime and NAEP Test Scores
Math Reading
Variables Grade 4 Grade 8 Grade 4 Grade 8
Panel (A) State Level Analysis
Ln(Violent) 0.002 -0.016 -0.042** -0.031
(0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020)
Unemployment -0.003 0.003 0.001 0.013**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
% Male -2.416** -1.630* -2.221* -1.002
(1.155) (0.844) (1.312) (0.974)
% Black -1.612** -1.079*** -1.055 -0.407
(0.643) (0.337) (0.654) (0.410)
% Minority -0.137 -0.476 0.192 -0.451
(0.342) (0.399) (0.504) (0.396)
Observations 381 412 419 334
Number of States 51 51 51 51
R-squared 0.930 0.848 0.513 0.277
Panel (B) Trial Urban District Level Analysis
Ln(Violent) -0.191 -0.098 -0.316** -0.219*
(0.214) (0.222) (0.140) (0.116)
Unemployment 0.001 0.016 -0.004 0.033
(0.018) (0.019) (0.013) (0.020)
% Male -2.223 -4.262 -2.764 -1.570
(6.386) (4.651) (2.113) (2.403)
% Black -2.588 1.924 -1.874*** 1.096**
(1.818) (1.536) (0.421) (0.382)
% Minority 6.922*** 4.211 2.200 2.154
(2.246) (2.538) (2.083) (2.625)
Observations 69 69 75 74
Number of Dist. 20 20 20 20
R-squared 0.797 0.822 0.777 0.566
Note: Table 3.8 presents fixed effects model estimates for stan-
dardized math and reading scores for grade 4 and 8 students.
One-year lags are used for all of the covariates to adjust for
the fact that tests are taken at the beginning of a calender
year. Ln(Violent) is the log of the number of violent crime per
100,000 people. Unemployment represents the state unemploy-
ment rate. Minority is defined as people who are non-whites
and non-blacks. Coefficient for state and year fixed effects are
not shown. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: NAEP, BEA and UCR
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Table 3.9: Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) Implementation by State
State Initial Plot Operational Statewide Programs Covered
Alabama April 1997 November 1997 SNAP, TANF and Other
Alaska February 1998 June 1998 SNAP, TANF and Other
Arizona July 1998 August 1999 SNAP, TANF and Other
Arkansas September 1997 April 1998 SNAP and TANF
California August 2002 June 2004 SNAP, TANF and Other
Colorado February 1997 February 1998 SNAP, TANF and Other
Connecticut February 1997 October 1997 SNAP, TANF and Other
Delaware June 2003 September 2003 SNAP
District of Columbia June 1998 October 1998 SNAP and Other
Florida October 1997 October 1998 SNAP, TANF and Other
Georgia July 1997 November 1998 SNAP, TANF and Other
Hawaii March 1998 August 1998 SNAP, TANF and Other
Idaho September 1997 February 1998 SNAP, TANF and Other
Illinois November 1996 November 1997 SNAP, TANF and Other
Indiana May 2001 March 2002 SNAP and TANF
Iowa June 2003 October 2003 SNAP
Kansas August 1996 March 1997 SNAP, TANF and Other
Kentucky May 1999 November 1999 SNAP and Other
Louisiana January 1997 December 1997 SNAP and TANF
Maine April 2003 June 2003 SNAP and TANF
Maryland November 1989 April 1993 SNAP and Other
Massachusetts April 1997 October 1997 SNAP, TANF and Other
Michigan June 2000 July 2001 SNAP, TANF and Other
Minnesota September 1991 October 1998 SNAP, TANF and Other
Mississippi May 2002 October 2002 SNAP, TANF and Other
Missouri June 1997 May 1998 SNAP and TANF
Montana February 2002 July 2002 SNAP, TANF and Other
(continued)
Note: Full name of the programs covered are Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP) and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Example of other programs cov-
ered in some states are Unemployment Compensation, Adult Assistance, State Programs, Job
Training Programs, General Assistance, Refugee Assistance, General Relief, State Supplemental
Funds, Cash Assistance, Independent Living for Teens in Foster Care, Aid to the Blind, Aid to
the Permanently and Totally Disabled, Child Care and more.
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service
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Table 3.10: Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) Implementation by State
State Initial Plot Operational Statewide Programs Covered
(continued)
Nebraska February 2002 September 2002 SNAP
Nevada October 2001 July 2002 SNAP
New Hampshire August 1998 January 1999 SNAP, TANF and Other
New Jersey February 1994 June 1999 SNAP, TANF and Other
New Mexico September 1990 August 1995 SNAP, TANF and Other
New York March 1999 February 2001 SNAP, TANF and Other
North Carolina April 1998 June 1999 SNAP
North Dakota February 1996 March 1997 SNAP
Ohio March 1992 October 1999 SNAP
Oklahoma June 1997 January 1998 SNAP, TANF and Other
Oregon September 1997 May 1998 SNAP, TANF and Other
Pennsylvania October 1997 September 1998 SNAP, TANF and Other
Rhode Island June 1998 October 1998 SNAP and TANF
South Carolina November 1994 December 1995 SNAP
South Dakota February 1996 March 1997 SNAP
Tennessee November 1998 August 1999 SNAP and TANF
Texas September 1994 November 1995 SNAP and TANF
Utah October 1995 April 1996 SNAP, TANF and Other
Vermont June 1998 October 1998 SNAP, TANF and Other
Virginia November 2001 July 2002 SNAP, TANF and Other
Washington March 1999 November 1999 SNAP, TANF and Other
West Virginia September 2002 June 2003 SNAP and TANF
Wisconsin October 1999 October 2000 SNAP
Wyoming March 1995 January 2000 SNAP
Note: Full name of the programs covered are Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP) and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Example of other pro-
grams covered in some states are Unemployment Compensation, Adult Assistance, State
Programs, Job Training Programs, General Assistance, Refugee Assistance, General Relief,
State Supplemental Funds, Cash Assistance, Independent Living for Teens in Foster Care,
Aid to the Blind, Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, Child Care and more.
Source: United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service
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Variables Mean Diff. P-value
1996
Violent Crime Rate 504.22 423.55 80.67 0.634
Property Crime Rate 3767.20 3463.75 303.45 0.588
GDP Per Capita 28815 28135 680 0.838
Personal Income Per Capita 24748 23194 1554 0.501
Percent in Poverty 12.67 12.96 -0.29 0.887
2002
Violent Crime Rate 395.68 366.83 28.85 0.803
Property Crime Rate 3095.29 2950.50 144.79 0.736
GDP Per Capita 36547 36615 -68 0.989
Personal Income Per Capita 31849 30318 1531 0.636
Percent in Poverty 11.76 12.32 -0.56 0.740
Note: There are nine states that implemented the EBT program in 1997
(Alabama, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania and South Dakota) and five states that implemented
the EBT program in 2003 or 2004 (California, Delaware, Iowa, Maine and
West Virginia).
Source: UCR and BEA
Table 3.12: Summary Statistics from NLSY97 Variables
Percent of Sample
Variables All Area High Crime Low Crime Diff. (P-value)
High School Dropouts 17.9 22.1 13.0 9.1 (0.000)
Enrolled in College 51.2 47.9 55.0 7.1 (0.000)
Enrolled in Bachelor’s Program 36.7 33.3 40.7 7.4 (0.000)
Black or Hispanic 48.1 64.8 28.7 36.1 (0.000)
Mother: College or Higher 47.9 45.1 51.1 -6.0 (0.000)
High GPA from 8th Grade 42.7 39.9 45.8 -5.9 (0.000)
Use Tobacco or Alcohol 64.2 59.3 69.4 -10.1 (0.000)
Committed Crime 18.3 17.0 19.7 -2.7 (0.001)
Note: Students in counties with crime rates above the median crime rate are labeled as
living in High Crime Area. Crime rate that represents the county is calculated by the
average of county-level log violent crime rate for years students were in high school.
Source: NLS Investigator - https://www.nlsinfo.org/investigator/pages/login.jsp
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Table 3.13: Estimates of the Effect of EBT Implementation on Crime Rate from the First
Stage of the IV Model
Dropout Ernollment
High Schools All Colleges Associate’s Bachelor’s
Variables Ln(Violent) Ln(Violent) Ln(Violent) Ln(Violent)
EBT Implementation -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.045***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Ln(Personal Inc/capita) 0.403 0.403 0.403 0.403
(0.546) (0.546) (0.546) (0.546)
Unemployment Rate 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Observations 58,835 58,835 58,835 58,835
Test of Excluded Instrument
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 28.33 28.33 28.33 28.33
Anderson-Rubin Wald test 13.51 10.56 2.52 4.94
Note: Table 3.13 presents first stage estimates that identify the effect of the EBT implementation
on the violent crime rates. One-year lag is used for the EBT implementation variable. Ln(Personal
Inc/capita) represents the state-level personal income per capita. Unemployment rate represents
the state-level unemployment rate. Coefficients of student and year fixed effects are not shown.
The sample covers the period 1997 to 2009 and students who are from families ineligible for wel-
fare benefits. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: NLSY97, BEA and UCR
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Table 3.14: Reduced Form Estimates of the Effect of EBT Implementation
on Educational Attainment
Dropout Enrollment
Variables High Schools All Colleges Associate’s Bachelor’s
EBT Implementation -0.006*** 0.020*** 0.006 0.016**
(0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Ln(Personal Inc/capita) -0.023 0.078 -0.179 0.257
(0.054) (0.165) (0.142) (0.178)
Unemployment Rate -0.001 -0.004 -0.016** 0.007
(0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Observations 59,516 59,516 59,516 59,516
Number of Students 7,965 7,965 7,965 7,965
R-squared 0.052 0.353 0.158 0.271
Note: Table 3.14 presents reduced form estimates for the effect of the EBT imple-
mentation on the probability of dropping out of high school and the probability
of enrolling in college. Ln(Personal Inc/capita) represents the state-level personal
income per capita. Unemployment rate represents the state-level unemployment
rate. Coefficients of student and year fixed effects are not shown. The sample
covers the period 1997 to 2009 and students who are from families ineligible for
welfare benefits. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: NLSY97, BEA and UCR
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Table 3.15: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Violent Crime on Educational
Attainment
Dropout Ernollment
Variables High Schools All Colleges Associate’s Bachelor’s
Ln(Violent) 0.139** 0.141** -0.441*** -0.143 -0.353**
(0.070) (0.068) (0.166) (0.094) (0.156)
Ln(Personal Inc/capita) -0.080 0.256 -0.121 0.400
(0.096) (0.298) (0.145) (0.274)
Unemployment Rate -0.004 0.006 -0.013** 0.015
(0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010)
Observations 58,835 58,835 58,835 58,835 58,835
Number of Students 7,284 7,284 7,284 7,284 7,284
R-squared 0.040 0.040 0.341 0.158 0.260
F-statistic 21.95 28.33 28.33 28.33 28.33
Note: Table 3.15 presents 2SLS estimates for the effect of violent crime on the
probability of dropping out of high school and the probability of enrolling in col-
lege. Ln(Violent) is the log of the number of violent crime per 100,000 population.
Ln(Personal Inc/capita) represents the state-level personal income per capita. Unem-
ployment rate represents the state-level unemployment rate. Coefficients of student
and year fixed effects are not shown. The sample covers the period 1997 to 2009 and
students who are from families ineligible for welfare benefits. Standard errors are
clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: NLSY97, BEA and UCR
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Table 3.16: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Violent Crime on Educational
Attainment
Dropout Enrollment
Variables High Schools All Colleges Associate’s Bachelor’s
Ln(Violent) -0.012 -0.011 -0.097** 0.014
(0.012) (0.033) (0.038) (0.030)
Ln(Personal Inc/capita) -0.021 0.002 -0.114 0.153
(0.057) (0.172) (0.131) (0.197)
Unemployment Rate 0.000 -0.006 -0.013** 0.004
(0.002) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009)
Observations 69,470 69,470 69,470 69,470
Number of Students 8,964 8,964 8,964 8,964
R-squared 0.068 0.393 0.176 0.296
Note: Table 3.16 presents OLS estimates for the effect of violent crime on the
probability of dropping out of high school and the probability of enrolling in col-
lege. Ln(Violent) is the log of the number of violent crime per 100,000 population.
Ln(Personal Inc/capita) represents the state-level personal income per capita. Un-
employment rate represents the state-level unemployment rate. Coefficients of stu-
dent and year fixed effects are not shown. The sample covers the period 1997 to
2009 and students who are from families ineligible for welfare benefits. Standard
errors are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: NLSY97, BEA and UCR
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Table 3.17: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Violent Crime on Educational At-
tainment by Student Characteristic
Dropout Enrollment
Variables High Schools All Colleges Associate’s Bachelor’s
All Sample 0.141** -0.441*** -0.143 -0.353**
(0.068) (0.166) (0.094) (0.156)
Interacted with Characteristics
Male 0.257* -0.420** -0.118 -0.510**
(0.135) (0.209) (0.131) (0.212)
Female 0.020 -0.443** -0.161 -0.179
(0.044) (0.181) (0.119) (0.175)
Black or Hispanic 0.126 -0.571*** -0.440*** -0.372**
(0.127) (0.178) (0.154) (0.145)
Non-Black or Non-Hispanic 0.136 -0.202 0.086 -0.169
(0.091) (0.175) (0.155) (0.177)
Mother: College or Higher 0.136* -0.373* 0.021 -0.502**
(0.071) (0.197) (0.107) (0.231)
Mother: High School or Lower 0.133 -0.438** -0.335** -0.087
(0.086) (0.172) (0.158) (0.135)
High GPA in Gr. 8 0.040 -0.156 0.275 -0.264
(0.038) (0.211) (0.172) (0.236)
Low GPA in Gr. 8 0.212* -0.623*** -0.481*** -0.386***
(0.108) (0.198) (0.151) (0.125)
Use Tobacco or Alcohol 0.191* -0.625*** -0.253*** -0.487***
(0.102) (0.199) (0.098) (0.186)
No Tobacco or Alcohol Use 0.054 -0.089 0.065 -0.112
(0.054) (0.158) (0.121) (0.158)
Committed Crime 0.148 -0.319 -0.471** 0.151
(0.123) (0.239) (0.189) (0.382)
Not Committed Crime 0.143** -0.470*** -0.068 -0.476***
(0.072) (0.177) (0.109) (0.179)
Note: Table 3.17 presents 2SLS estimates for the effect of violent crime on the probability
of dropping out of high school and the probability of enrolling in college interacted with
student characteristics. Each estimate is from a separate regression. Coefficients of con-
trols, student and year fixed effects are not shown. The sample covers the period 1997 to
2009 and students who are from families ineligible for welfare benefits. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: NLSY97, BEA and UCR
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Table 3.18: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Violent Crime on Ed-
ucational Attainment by Sample Period
Variables 2007 2008 2009 2010
Panel (A) High School Dropout
Ln(Violent) 0.175** 0.141** 0.141** 0.127**
(0.086) (0.068) (0.068) (0.063)
Ln(Personal Inc/capita) -0.086 -0.054 -0.080 -0.071
(0.110) (0.087) (0.096) (0.094)
Unemployment Rate -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Observations 48,848 53,776 58,835 64,003
Number of Students 6,921 7,090 7,284 7,470
R-squared 0.038 0.041 0.040 0.041
Panel (B) College Enrollment
Ln(Violent) -0.514*** -0.484*** -0.441*** -0.399***
(0.190) (0.180) (0.166) (0.154)
Ln(Personal Inc/capita) 0.124 0.140 0.256 0.195
(0.274) (0.262) (0.298) (0.301)
Unemployment Rate 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.001
(0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007)
Observations 48,848 53,776 58,835 64,003
Number of Students 6,921 7,090 7,284 7,470
R-squared 0.336 0.339 0.341 0.343
Note: Table 3.18 panel (A) presents 2SLS estimates for the effect of vio-
lent crime on the probability of dropping out of high school by different
sample period. Panel (B) shows 2SLS estimates on the likelihood of en-
rolling in post-secondary institution by different sample period. All sam-
ples start in 1997 but ends differently. Ln(Violent) is the log of the num-
ber of violent crime per 100,000 population. Ln(Personal Inc/capita) rep-
resents the state-level personal income per capita. Unemployment rate
represents the state-level unemployment rate. Coefficients of student and
year fixed effects are not shown. The sample includes students who are
from families ineligible for welfare benefits. Standard errors are clustered
at the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: NLSY97, BEA and UCR
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Table 3.19: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Violent Crime on Educational
Attainment by Alternative Sample Restriction
Ineligible Ineligible Ineligible Full Sample
Variables Main Exclude 5 States Over 200%
Panel (A) High School Dropout
Ln(Violent) 0.141** 0.122* 0.129** 0.125*
(0.068) (0.069) (0.064) (0.068)
Ln(Personal Inc/capita) -0.080 -0.083 -0.090 -0.072
(0.096) (0.093) (0.079) (0.101)
Unemployment Rate -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 58,835 51,273 50,396 77,905
Number of Students 7,284 6,366 6,268 9,491
R-squared 0.040 0.041 0.035 0.070
Panel (B) College Enrollment
Ln(Violent) -0.441*** -0.334** -0.396** -0.457***
(0.166) (0.157) (0.156) (0.153)
Ln(Personal Inc/capita) 0.256 0.258 0.336 0.143
(0.298) (0.270) (0.284) (0.298)
Unemployment Rate 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Observations 58,835 51,273 50,396 77,905
Number of Students 7,284 6,366 6,268 9,491
R-squared 0.341 0.349 0.357 0.298
Note: Table 3.19 panel (A) presents 2SLS estimates for the effect of violent crime on
probability of dropping out of high school. Panel (B) shows 2SLS estimates on the
likelihood of enrolling in post-secondary institution. Main ineligible sample is only
using students from families ineligible for welfare with gross income over 130 percent
of the poverty line. Over 200% sample only uses students from families ineligible for
welfare with gross income over 200 percent of the poverty line. Ln(Violent) is the log
of the number of violent crime per 100,000 population. Ln(Personal Inc/capita) rep-
resents the state-level personal income per capita. Unemployment rate represents the
state-level unemployment rate. Coefficients of student and year fixed effects are not
shown. The sample covers the period 1997 to 2009. Standard errors are clustered at
the state level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: NLSY97, BEA and UCR
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Table 3.20: 2SLS Estimates of the Effect of Violent Crime on Educational At-
tainment by Different Treatment of Movers
Dropout Ernollment
Variables High Schools All Colleges Associate’s Bachelor’s
Panel (A) Only Non-Movers
Ln(Violent) 0.165** -0.317** -0.155 -0.216*
(0.079) (0.142) (0.105) (0.127)
Ln(Personal Inc/capita) -0.074 0.141 -0.054 0.233
(0.121) (0.285) (0.174) (0.253)
Unemployment Rate -0.004 -0.000 -0.010 0.004
(0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
Observations 41,843 41,843 41,843 41,843
Number of Students 4,393 4,393 4,393 4,393
R-squared 0.044 0.328 0.159 0.247
Panel (B) Only Using Information from First State of Residence
Ln(Violent) 0.155** -0.434** -0.141 -0.348**
(0.072) (0.171) (0.101) (0.156)
Ln(Personal Inc/capita) -0.082 0.220 -0.151 0.377
(0.102) (0.308) (0.158) (0.272)
Unemployment Rate -0.004 0.004 -0.014** 0.014
(0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010)
Observations 55,403 55,403 55,403 55,403
Number of Students 6,259 6,259 6,259 6,259
R-squared 0.039 0.345 0.160 0.264
Note: Table 3.20 presents 2SLS estimates for the effect of violent crime on the probability
of dropping out of high school and the probability of enrolling in college. Ln(Violent) is
the log of the number of violent crime per 100,000 population. Ln(Personal Inc/capita)
represents the state-level personal income per capita. Unemployment rate represents
the state-level unemployment rate. Coefficients of student and year fixed effects are not
shown. The sample covers the period 1997 to 2009 and students who are from fami-
lies ineligible for welfare benefits. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: NLSY97, BEA and UCR
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Chapter 4
The Effect of the Safe
Schools/Healthy Students Initiative
on Educational Outcomes
Usually a grant with a specific goal targets a particular local agency in a community. For instance, a
grant targeted to improve educational outcomes will provide funding for the local education agency
to implement changes. However, a more comprehensive plan including other local agencies such as
community-level intervention could be effective in improving student outcomes as students spend
a lot of their time outside of school boundaries. In this paper, I analyze the effect of a grant that
focuses on the partnerships among local education agencies and other community partners such
as health and law agencies. The grant seeks to improve student outcomes, including educational
outcomes.
I examine the effect of the Safe Schools/Healthy Students (SS/HS) Initiative, a community-level
intervention, on educational outcomes. The SS/HS Initiative selects local education agencies based
on their proposals for partnerships with local mental health, law enforcement, and juvenile justice
agencies. Three key features of the SS/HS Initiative are that local education agencies consult with
community leaders to identify the most urgent local needs, the SS/HS Initiative emphasizes long-
term systems change, and the SS/HS Initiative stresses data-driven decision making. In terms of
the size of the SS/HS Initiative, it was awarded to 365 local education agencies from 1999 to 2009,
with grant amounts ranging from $400,000 to $3 million depending on the characteristics of the
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local education agency.1 Previous work on evaluation of the SS/HS Initiative found positive effects
of the Initiative, however, they commonly rely on a method that only focuses on the grantees and
compares outcomes from the baseline year to the third year after they receive the grant (Derzon et
al., 2012, other report).
I employ a difference-in-difference model and a propensity score matching model. Estimates
from both models show that the SS/HS Initiative increased enrollment in high schools. The focus
of both research designs is to select a set of local education agencies as control groups that are
otherwise similar to the grantee local education agencies. A well selected control group will help
identify the effect of the SS/HS Initiative by comparing outcomes between grantee local education
agencies and similar, non-grantee local education agencies. Since each research design requires
different identification assumptions, using two research designs that generate two different control
groups will provide additional confidence in the results when they are consistent with each other.
First, I employ a difference-in-difference model as a research design. This research design is
possible due to 3 years (1999, 2002, and 2005) of the applicant pool that the Initiative used to
select grantees for two years. In a regular year, applicants are submitted early in the year and the
grantees are awarded in the fall of that year. However, in the years 2000, 2003, and 2006, new
applications were not received and the previous year’s applicant pool was used. After regularly
selecting grantees for 1999, 2002, and 2005 from the same year’s applicant pool, grantees selected
in 2000, 2003, and 2006 were next-in-rank applicants from the previous year’s applicant pool. Thus,
latter group grantees (2000, 2003, and 2006) will provide a good comparison to the early group
grantees (1999, 2002, and 2005), since the latter group will always have a year less of treatment in
any given year.
The second approach is to use a propensity score matching model to identify the effect of the
SS/HS Initiative. A propensity score matching model selects control group local education agencies
that are similar to grantees but did not receive the grant. With a list of 365 local education agency
grantees but no information on the local education agencies that applied and did not win the grant,
a propensity score will measure the likelihood of receiving the grant using observable characteristics
for all local education agencies. Using these propensity scores, I employ various matching methods
to select the control group that is comparable to the grantees. Outcomes of these matched control
group is compared to the grantees’ outcomes, in order to estimate the effect of the Initiative on




Results from both research designs are consistent: the SS/HS Initiative increases high school
enrollment. First, the estimates from the difference-in-difference model show that the Initiative
increases grade 12 enrollment by 1.9 percent. There are no effects found for grade 9 and 10
enrollment in this approach. A second set of estimates from the propensity score matching model
indicate that the Initiative increases enrollment in all high school grades: 6.9 percent for grade 9
to 10.9 percent for grade 12. These matching estimates are robust to different matching methods.
This paper contributes to the literature by using control groups to assess the effect of the SS/HS
Initiative on educational outcomes. The advantage of using a control group to identify the effect of
the Initiative is that control groups provide a trajectory of the grantees in the absence of the grant.
Thus, comparing outcomes in years after receiving the grant between grantees and the control
group may provide additional information about the impact. Official evaluation reports and papers
studying the effect of the SS/HS Initiative determine the effect by comparing outcomes from the
baseline year to the third year after the initial grant. For instance, Derzon et al. (2012) find that
the SS/HS Initiative is associated with improved outcomes for youth when comparing Year 3 with
the Baseline Year using data from 57 grantees who initially received the grant in 2005 and 2006.
There are two main policy implications from the identified results. First of all, a community-
level intervention has been proven to be effective in improving educational outcomes. Policy makers
may encourage more partnerships among educational, health, and juvenile justice systems. Also,
certain successful aspects of the intervention could become standard in other communities that
may generate similar positive effects. Second, a grant process based on competition may help
local education agencies to initiate plans that are most effective for themselves as well as stimulate
collaboration among different community leaders. It may be helpful to provide stronger incentives
for local education agencies to be proactive in their situation.
4.1 About the Safe Schools/Healthy Students Initiative
The Safe Schools/Healthy Students (SS/HS) Initiative is a response by the federal government
to a request by community and educational leaders to model the collaboration among localities
(Mathews-Younes, 2002). Multiple school shootings took place during the 1997-98 school year, and
the shootings took place in widespread locations (rural, suburban, urban areas). Also, the shooters
were not gang members nor had previous connections to crime. This changed public perception of
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school violence and thus led to discussions among federal agencies and community and educational
leaders. The Department of Education, Health and Human Services, and Justice launched the
SS/HS Initiative on April 1, 1999 as the primary mechanism for the federal government to support
school violence prevention (Furlong et al., 2003).
The SS/HS Initiative supports school and community partnerships by encouraging integrated
systems among local education agencies, local public mental health authorities, and local law en-
forcement agencies. Each local education agency can choose the interventions they propose to
implement in their application and a certain number of local education agencies receive the grant
to actually implement the interventions.2 Once selected as a grantee, the local education agencies
receive 4 consecutive years of funding to implement their proposed interventions. There are five
program goals each grantee has to address: creating safe and violence-free schools; preventing and
reducing alcohol, tobacco and other drug use; enhancing early childhood social and emotional learn-
ing and development; enhancing mental, emotional and behavioral health; and connecting family,
schools and communities (Modzeleski et al., 2012).3 Three key features of the Initiative are that
local education agencies consult with community leaders to identify the most urgent local needs, it
emphasizes long-term systems change, and it stresses data-driven decision making.
Figure 4.1 shows 365 local education agencies that received the SS/HS Initiative grant in 49
states and DC. Figure 4.2 shows the number of grantees by year from 1999 to 2009. The SS/HS
Initiative offered more than $2 billion in funding, which is significant relative to each grantees total
revenue. The average grant amount per grantee was $1.45 million, which is, on average, 3.3 percent
of the total revenue of the local education agency.4 Comparing the significance of the Initiative
grant to other sources of revenue for the local education agencies, revenue from all federal sources is
on average 12.4 percent and revenue from compensatory support (Title I) is on average 2.6 percent
for the grantees.5 Also, the grant is more likely to have a significant impact on students through
proposed interventions as no more than 10 percent of the total grant for each year may be used
to support costs associated with (1) security equipment and personnel and (2) minor remodeling
2Information on the number of applicants is available from 2007 to 2009. Number of applicants in 2007 is 347,
in 2008 is 355 and in 2009 is 494. In those three years, 27, 60, and 29 local education agencies received the grant,
respectively.
3These are program goals for grantees from 2007 and later. For grantees before 2007, there are six goals each grantee
had to address: safe school environment, alcohol and other drugs and violence prevention and early intervention,
school and community mental health preventive and treatment intervention services, early childhood psychosocial
and emotional development services, educational reform, and safe school polices.
4There is a limit in the grant amount a local education agency can receive as determined by their local area. In
2004, the limit was $1 million for rural local education agencies, $2 million for suburban local education agencies,
and $3 million for urban local education agencies.
5Data on the grant amount each grantee receives is from 2004 to 2009.
75
of school facilities to improve school safety. In terms of the number of students affected by the
Initiative, it provided services to over 13 million youth over the course of 11 years. The average
number of students per grantee was 24,549 and the average number of high school students per
grantee was 6,852.
To have a better understanding of the interventions implemented by the grantees, interventions
implemented by High School District 201, Cicero, IL (Cook County) are listed (Telleen et al. 2013).
This school district received the grant from 1999 to 2003, during 4 school years. Just focusing on
interventions for high school students, there are three different level of interventions: district-wide,
school-wide, and targeted individual interventions. District-wide interventions include a Crisis
Management Plan, Emergency Preparedness, and Threat Assessment Planning (Grades K-12).
School-wide interventions include Surveillance System, Attendance Initiative, Stop Gun Violence
Art Contest, Town Vehicle Sticker, and Club-Leaders in Full Effect (Grades 9-12). Targeted indi-
vidual programs include Wraparound Case Management (Grades 1-12), School Outreach Worker,
Case Management, Support Groups Day Care, Health Care, and Network of Services (Grades 9-12).
The Initiative may affect student outcomes through many different mechanisms. First, the
Initiative increases available funding for local education agencies such that it may implement inter-
ventions to help students. This may increase educational outcomes through effective interventions
for students. Second, the Initiative creates additional positive effects by generating collaboration
among local authorities. It promotes collaboration among educational, behavioral health, and crim-
inal and juvenile justice systems that could create positive externalities a narrowly targeted grant
may not achieve.
4.2 Empirical Strategy and Data
In this section, I explain the two research designs and how they use different groups of local
education agencies as a control group: a difference-in-difference model and a propensity score
matching model. Since each research design requires different identification assumptions, results
from the two approaches provide evidence on the effect of the SS/HS Initiative on educational




As a first approach to identify the effect of the SS/HS Initiative, I employ a difference-in-difference
estimator. This research design is possible due to 3 years (1999, 2002, and 2005) of the applicant
pool that the Initiative used to select grantees for two consecutive years. In a regular year, ap-
plications are submitted early in the year and the grantees are awarded in the fall of that year.
However, in the years 2000, 2003, and 2006, new applications were not received and the previous
years applicant pool was used. After regularly selecting grantees for 1999, 2002, and 2005 from
the same years applicant pool, next-in-rank applicants from 1999, 2002, and 2005 were selected
as grantees in 2000, 2003, and 2006, respectively. For example, lets focus on the 1999 and 2000
cohort.6 Both groups of grantees submitted their applications in 1999. After going through the
selection process, the top 54 local education agencies received the grant starting from 1999. Since
no new applications were received in 2000, the 23 next-in-rank local education agencies from the
1999 applicant pool received the grant starting from 2000. The shaded part of Figure 4.3 displays
where the identification comes from for the basic difference-in-difference estimator.
The equation for the difference-in-difference model is,
Yjt = β0 + β1EarlyGranteejt ∗Afterjt + β2EarlyGranteejt + β3Afterjt + µt + jt (4.1)
with Yjt: Log of high school enrollment rate (per 1,000 population aged 5-17) in local education
agency j, year t. Variable EarlyGranteejt takes a value of 1 for local education agency j that
received the grant in year 1999, 2002, and 2005, and 0 for local education agency j that received
the grant in year 2000, 2003, and 2006. Afterjt takes a value of 1 for years 1999, 2002, and
2005, and 0 for years 1998, 2001, 2004. µt represents year fixed effects that control for macro-level
common shocks all local education agencies face in a particular year and jt is an error term. All
standard errors are clustered at the cohort level to account for the possible correlation of errors
among grantees selected in the same year. The key identification assumption in each research
design is that there exits similar trend in outcome variables between the early group grantees and
the latter group grantees before the initial year of the grant (parallel trend assumption).
The advantage of this research design is that local education agencies in both groups, treatment
and control, are similar as all of them submitted applications for the Initiative and ranked high
in the selection process. The latter group grantees (2000, 2003, and 2006 cohorts) will provide
61999 cohort refers to the local education agencies that received the grant starting in 1999.
77
a good comparison to the early group grantees (1999, 2002, and 2005 cohorts). The early group
grantees are labeled as the treatment group and the latter group grantees are labeled as the control
group. Comparing the early group and latter group grantees in their outcomes will provide a causal
estimate of the effect of each additional year into the grant since the latter group will always have
a year less of treatment in any given year. For instance, using the shaded area of Figure 4.3 for the
analysis will provide the estimate of the effect of the first year of the Initiative. Moving this time
frame window to a year later will provide the estimate of the effect of the second year of the grant.
4.2.2 Propensity Score Matching Model
As a second approach, I use a propensity score matching model to estimate the effect of the SS/HS
Initiative on educational outcomes. The first step of this approach is to estimate the likelihood
of receiving the grant for all local education agencies using a regression with a binary dependent
variable. This step generates the propensity score based on the observable characteristics of each
local education agency. Then, I construct a control group of local education agencies by matching
grantees to the other non-grantee local education agencies that are similar in their propensity scores.
By comparing the grantees to the matched control group, I will estimate the average treatment
effects on the treated (ATET) of the SS/HS Initiative.
I estimate the propensity score using all local education agencies in the US due to limited
information available. Estimating the propensity score using a more similar group such as the
applicant pool may be the ideal approach, but it is difficult to narrow down the population with
the limited information. One can categorize all local education agencies into three groups: grantees,
those that applied but were not selected, and those that did not apply for the grant. Since there
may exist selection of local education agencies into applying for the grant, the first two groups
and the last group may be quite different.7 However, those local education agencies that applied
for the grant but were not selected are not publicly identified, while the list of all grantees for the
SS/HS Initiative from 1999 to 2009 is publicly available.8 Thus, with this limited information, the
propensity score estimation is carried on using the population of local educational agencies.
A probit model identifies the propensity score using the population of local education agencies
7Information on the number of applicants is available from 2007 to 2009. In 2007, there were 27 grantees out
of 347 applicants (320 applicants in the second group), and all other local education agencies did not apply for the
grant. In 2008 and 2009, the numbers of grantees were 60 and 29 out of 355 and 494 applicants, respectively.
8Two FOIA requests have been denied by the Department of Education and Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration about the information of those local education agencies that applied for the Initiative but
were not selected.
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as one group. This probit model includes the log of population aged 5 to 17, the log of total
local revenue, the log of current spending per pupil, and the percent of Title-I funding as well as
indicator variables for three different type of local area (urban, suburban, and rurual). Using the
estimated propensity scores for each local education agency, two matching methods are used to
generate a matched control group for the grantees. They are the nearest neighbor matching and
caliper matching. These matched control groups help estimate the average treatment effects on the
treated (ATET).
I also employ within-state matching, which is an analogy to state fixed effects in a panel regres-
sion. The propensity score estimation is separately done by local education agencies in each state.
Then the grantees are matched to other local education agencies located in the same state using
the propensity scores. Identical to the previous matching methods, the nearest neighbor matching
and caliper matching is used in within-state matching. This approach generates another version
of average treatment effect of the treated (ATET). The quality of the match from the within-
state matching might be worse than the approach that uses the population, however, unobserved
characteristics could be controlled in the within-state matching.
There are three identification assumptions in the propensity score matching model. First, the
conditional independence assumption is such that the outcomes are independent of treatment,
conditional on X (y1, y0 ⊥ T |X) must be satisfied. For ATET, that assumption can be relaxed
to E[y0|T = 1, X] = E[y0|T = 0, X] = E[y0|X]. Second, a common support assumption is
required. For each treated observation, there is a matched control observation with similar X
(pr(T = 1|X) ∈ (0, 1)). Third, there should not exist any general equilibrium effects. The treatment
should not indirectly affect the control observations.
4.2.3 Data
Most of the information about the description of the SS/HS Initiative and the details are from
the official website of the SS/HS Initiative.9 The website provides a list of grantees by year from
1999 to 2009 as well as the official evaluation report of the Initiative by the National Evaluation
Team(NET).10 Information on the amount of funding each grantee received is from the Department
of Education website, but it is publicly available from 2004 to 2009.11





from multiple sources. Total enrollment for local education agencies in each high school grade,
grades 9 to 12, is the main educational outcome analyzed in this study. This enrollment data is
from the Common Core of Data (CCD) provided by the National Center for Education Statistics,
which is from 1992 to 2012. In addition, test results for local education agencies will be used as
an additional educational outcome. Test results are from the National Longitudinal School-Level
State Assessment Score Database (NLSLSASD). Other local education agency characteristics used
in the analysis are finance, population, and poverty rate. Finance information of the local education
agencies are from the Public Elementary-Secondary Education Finance Data provided by the U.S.
Census Bureau (1992-2012). Local education agency population and poverty information is from
the Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) provided by the U.S. Census Bureau (1995,
1997, 1999-2012).
Table 4.1 shows that the average of all characteristics and outcomes between the grantees and
non-grantees are statistically different from each other. Average population and poverty rate are
higher in the grantee group as well as the total local revenue. Local area type of the grantees
and non-grantees are different, implying that grantee local education agencies are more urban than
average non-grantees. These differences may be amplified due to the small number of grantees for
the Initiative over 11 years (365 grantees) and the large number of non-grantees in the population
of local education agencies.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Difference-in-Difference Model
Table 4.2 shows that the average enrollments and other characteristics in early grantees and latter
grantees are not statistically different from each other. Early grantees are local education agencies
that received the grant in 1999, 2002, and 2005, which includes 54, 46, and 40 grantees, respectively.
Latter grantees are those that received the grant in 2000, 2003, and 2006, which includes 23, 23,
and 19 local education agencies, respectively. Thus, comparing 140 early grantees with 65 latter
grantees will provide difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of each additional year of the
Initiative.
Table 4.3 shows the effect of receiving the grant for the first year comparing early grantees
to latter grantees. The estimates indicate that the first year of the Safe School/Healthy Student
Initiative increases enrollments in grades 12 by 1.9 percent. The estimate for grade 11 enrollment,
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0.017, is similar to the effect on grade 12 enrollment, however, it is not statistically significant. In
contrast, the same positive effect of the Initiative is not present in grade 9 and grade 10 enrollments.
The effect of additional years of the Initiative may be identified in further analysis.
4.3.2 Propensity Score Matching Model
The first step in applying a propensity score matching model is to estimate a probit model to calcu-
late the propensity score for each local education agency. Table 4.4 shows that higher population,
current spending per pupil, and percent of Title-I revenue increase the likelihood of receiving the
SS/HS Initiative grant.12 Also, consistent with our intuition, local education agencies with higher
total local revenue are less likely to receive the grant. Lastly, urban and rural local education
agencies are more likely to receive the grant.
Using the estimated propensity scores, Table 4.5shows the average of certain variables for the
grantees and matched control local education agencies. As variables without a star next to their
mean indicate that the average is not statistically different at the 5 percent level, many variable
averages are not statistically different. A further developed propensity score estimate will include
interaction terms as well as higher order terms to improve the flexibility of the equation.
Table 4.6 shows the average treatment effects on the treated (ATET) of the Initiative. Estimated
propensity scores allow one to match each grantee with a similar non-grantee local education agency
through the nearest neighbor matching and caliper matching. The first row of Table 4.6 shows
the estimates by the nearest neighbor matching. The results indicate that grade 9 and grade 10
enrollments increase by 14.1 and 17.1 percent. The estimate for the grade 12 enrollment is smaller:
12.3 percent increase in grade 12 enrollment. As Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder (2003) state that
estimates of average treatment effects should take into consideration that the propensity score is
estimated. The standard errors that incorporates the point raised by them are similar.
A more flexible form of a probit model may be used to estimate the propensity scores to
match each grantees with a non-grantee local educational agencies as a control group. The flexible
form includes interaction terms between type of local area (urban, suburban, and rural) and other
characteristics such as the log of population aged 5 to 17, the log of total local revenue, the log
of current spending per pupil, and the percent of Title-I funding. Second row in Table 4.6 shows
the ATET from a probit model that includes interaction terms between type of local area and
different characteristics. The estimates are statistically significant but smaller than the estimates
12Title-I is a federal education funding to schools with high number of children living in poverty.
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from the first row. Lastly, the third row shows ATET by caliper matching that are smaller than
the estimates from the nearest neighbor matching.
Table 4.7 shows estimates of ATET using within-state matching that are similar to results from
Table 4.6. The within-state matching is an analogy to state fixed effects in a panel regression that
restricts each grantees match to those local education agencies in the same state. Applying nearest
neighbor matching and caliper matching, the estimates of ATET are similar for all grades.
4.3.3 The Impact of the Initiative by Grantee Characteristic
The effect of the Initiative may be different by the enrollment size each grantee has. Grantees
with smaller student enrollment may display larger change in enrollment because of their ease in
responding to challenges. Also, grantees with a smaller student body could be more effective in
creating collaborative interventions. Table 4.8 shows that grantees with below median enrollment
size show a large increase in all grade enrollment, ranging from 5.6 to 11.5 percent.
Additional heterogeneity may be present by the grant amounts each local education agency
receives. Local education agencies that receive larger amount of grant may implement greater
number of interventions to improve educational outcomes. Table 4.9 shows that estimates are not
statistically different between grantees with above and below median grant amount. The standard
errors are larger in this analysis because information about the grant amount is only available for
grantees that received the grant after 2004.
4.4 Conclusions
Two research designs with multiple specifications consistently show that the SS/HS Initiative in-
creases high school enrollment. First, the results from the difference-in-difference estimator show
that the first year of the grant increases grade 12 enrollments by 1.9 percent, but not for grade 9
and grade 10 enrollments. Second, average treatment effects on the treated (ATET) estimates from
the propensity score matching model indicate that the Initiative increases enrollment in all high
school grades, 6.9 percent for grade 9 to 10.9 percent for grade 12. When within-state matching is
applied, the estimates are smaller in magnitude.
These results indicate two main policy implications. First, a community-level intervention is
effective in increasing enrollment at the local education agency level. Policy makers may expand
community-level interventions to increase educational outcomes by encouraging more partnerships
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among educational, health, and juvenile justice systems. Furthermore, certain successful aspects of
the collaborative interventions may be implemented in other communities, and they may generate
similar positive effects. Second, distribution of grants based on competition may help local educa-
tion agencies to initiate plans as well as stimulate collaboration among different community leaders
that are most effective for themselves. This may provide stronger incentives for local education
agencies to be proactive in their situation.
4.5 Figures and Tables
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Figure 4.1: Map of Grantees
Source: http://www.sshs.samhsa.gov/default.aspx
Figure 4.2: Number of Grantees by Year
Source: http://www.sshs.samhsa.gov/default.aspx
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Figure 4.3: Example for 1999 and 2000 Cohort
Source: http://www.sshs.samhsa.gov/default.aspx
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Grantees Others
Variables Mean N Mean N
Log(5-17 Pop.) 9.24 4924 6.92* 218156
Poverty Rate for 5-17 207 4924 157* 218156
Log(Local Rev.) 10.04 7051 7.96* 307340
Log(Cur. Spnd. per Pupil) 9.09 5154 9.04* 219334
Percent of Federal Title-I 2.72 5419 1.85* 236246
Prop. of Urban LEA 0.37 7326 0.08* 348879
Prop. of Suburban LEA 0.43 7326 0.36* 348879
Prop. of Rural LEA 0.16 7326 0.43* 348879
Log(Gr 9 Enrollment) 6.57 6525 4.67* 245090
Log(Gr 10 Enrollment) 6.46 6528 4.63* 244309
Log(Gr 11 Enrollment) 6.34 6520 4.56* 243660
Log(Gr 12 Enrollment) 6.25 6517 4.51* 242825
Note: Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics for popula-
tion, poverty rate, finance, and enrollment variables used
in the analysis. * means that the mean is statistically dif-
ferent between group of grantees and other local education
agencies at 5 percent level.
Source: Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, Public
Elementary-Secondary Education Finance Data, and Com-
mon Core of Data
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics for DiD Sample
Early Grantees Latter Grantees
(1999, 2002, 2005) (2000, 2003, 2006)
Variables Mean N Mean N
Log(5-17 Pop.) 9.38 182 9.24 100
Poverty Rate for 5-17 184 182 176 100
Log(Local Rev.) 10.28 252 10.15 128
Log(Cur. Spnd. per Pupil) 8.99 238 8.89 122
Percent of Federal Title-I 2.67 252 2.70 128
Prop. of Urban LEA 0.43 262 0.39 129
Prop. of Suburban LEA 0.42 262 0.44 129
Prop. of Rural LEA 0.13 262 0.12 129
Log(Gr 9 Enrollment) 6.87 233 6.83 113
Log(Gr 10 Enrollment) 6.70 234 6.68 113
Log(Gr 11 Enrollment) 6.60 233 6.50 114
Log(Gr 12 Enrollment) 6.44 233 6.40 114
Note: Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics for population, poverty
rate, finance, and enrollment in grade 9 to 12 for early and latter grantees
used in the difference-in-difference analysis. * means that the mean is sta-
tistically different between group of grantees and other local education
agencies at 5 percent level.
Source: Common Core of Data
Table 4.3: Difference-in-Difference Model Estimates
Log Enrollment in
Variables Gr 9 Gr 10 Gr 11 Gr 12
Grantee*After -0.009 -0.029 0.017 0.019*
(0.014) (0.018) (0.021) (0.010)
Grantee 0.090 0.060 0.183 0.136
(0.104) (0.151) (0.167) (0.176)
After -1.202 -1.098*** -1.227*** -1.157***
(0.078) (0.094) (0.154) (0.187)
Observations 347 347 347 347
R-squared 0.105 0.099 0.104 0.092
Note: Table 4.3 presents difference-in-difference model esti-
mates for number of student in grade 9 to 12. Coefficient for
year fixed effects are not shown. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the cohort level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, Public
Elementary-Secondary Education Finance Data, and Com-
mon Core of Data
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Table 4.4: Probit Estimates of the Determinants of
Grantee Status
Variables Coef. (S.E) P-value
Log(5-17 Pop.) 0.655*** (0.025) 0.000
Log(Total Local Rev.) -0.211*** (0.023) 0.000
Log(Cur. Spnd. per pupil) 0.825*** (0.060) 0.000
Percent of Title-I 0.058*** (0.005) 0.000
Suburban LEA -0.393*** (0.028) 0.000





Note: Table 4.4 presents probit model estimates for num-
ber of student in grade 9 to 12. Log(5-17 Pop.) is the log of
population aged 5 to 17. Log(Total Local Rev.) is the log
of total local revenue. Log(Cur. Spnd. per pupil) is the log
of current spending per pupil. Percent of Title-I is the per-
cent of Title-I funding. Coefficient for state and year fixed
effects are not shown. The sample covers the period 1986-
2011. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, Public
Elementary-Secondary Education Finance Data, and Com-
mon Core of Data
Table 4.5: Summary Statistics: Matched Sample
Grantees Matched Controls
Variables Mean N Mean N
Log(5-17 Pop.) 9.39 2756 9.36 2618
Poverty Rate for 5-17 215 2756 220 2618
Log(Local Rev.) 10.40 3019 10.49 2618
Log(Cur. Spnd. per Pupil) 9.22 2864 9.16* 2618
Percent of Federal Title-I 3.00 3019 3.03 2618
Local Area Type 1.72 3080 1.76* 2618
Note: Table 4.5 presents descriptive statistics for population,
poverty rate, finance, and enrollment variables used in the
propensity score matching model. * means that the mean is sta-
tistically different between group of grantees and matched con-
trols at 5 percent level.
Source: Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, Public
Elementary-Secondary Education Finance Data, and Common
Core of Data
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Gr 9 Gr 10 Gr 11 Gr 12
Nearest Neighbor Matching
ATET 0.141 0.171 0.165 0.123
(0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044)
Nearest Neighbor Matching
with Interaction Term
ATET 0.069 0.095 0.111 0.109
(0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Caliper Matching
ATET 0.037 0.099 0.098 0.045
(0.012) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042)
Note: Table 4.6 presents ATET from a propensity score matching
model for log number of students in grade 9 to 12.
Source: Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, Public
Elementary-Secondary Education Finance Data, and Common
Core of Data
Table 4.7: Average Treatment Effects on the Treated
(ATET) using Within-State Matching
Within-State Matching
Log Enrollment in
Variables Gr 9 Gr 10 Gr 11 Gr 12
Nearest Neighbor Matching
ATET 0.023 0.017 0.025 0.033
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
Caliper Matching
ATET 0.043 0.033 0.042 0.035
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019)
Note: Table 4.7 presents ATET from a propensity score matching
model for log number of students in grade 9 to 12.
Source: Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, Public
Elementary-Secondary Education Finance Data, and Common
Core of Data
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Table 4.8: Average Treatment Effects on the Treated
(ATET) by Enrollment Size
Log Enrollment in
Variables Gr 9 Gr 10 Gr 11 Gr 12
Above Median Enrollment
ATET 0.047 0.013 -0.011 -0.016
(0.040) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038)
Below Median Enrollment
ATET 0.115 0.056 0.059 0.079
(0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Note: Table 4.8 presents ATET from a propensity score match-
ing model for log number of students in grade 9 to 12.
Source: Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, Public
Elementary-Secondary Education Finance Data, and Common
Core of Data
Table 4.9: Average Treatment Effects on the Treated
(ATET) by Grant Amount
Log Enrollment in
Variables Gr 9 Gr 10 Gr 11 Gr 12
Above Median Grant
ATET 0.086 0.182 0.045 -0.040
(0.518) (0.483) (0.502) (0.483)
Below Median Grant
ATET 0.156 0.121 0.202 0.218
(0.237) (0.256) (0.260) (0.275)
Note: Table 4.8 presents ATET from a propensity score
matching model for log number of students in grade 9 to 12.
Source: Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, Public
Elementary-Secondary Education Finance Data, and Com-
mon Core of Data
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